Marx's Economy and Beyond by Harvey, M & Geras, N
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY 
CENTRE FOR RESEARCH IN ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY AND INNOVATION 
WORKING PAPER SERIES: ISSN 1759-2860 
 
MARX’S ECONOMY AND BEYOND 
 
CRESI WORKING PAPER NUMBER: 2013-004 
 
Authors: Mark Harvey, Professor, Department of Sociology, University of Essex 
             Norman Geras, Emeritus Professor, Department of Government, University of 
             Manchester 
 
 
Contact: MHarvey@essex.ac.uk, normblog@yahoo.co.uk 
 
             
 
 
 1 
 
Abstract: 
Following renewed interest in Marx’s political economy in the wake of the financial crisis, the 
paper aims to make a contribution to debates re-evaluating Marx’s theory of capitalism and 
his conceptualisation of the relationship between the polity and economy. We bring together 
our approaches from political philosophy, economic sociology, and political economy, 
making the case for a renewal of historical materialism. We develop a perspective of a 
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capitalist political economies. The paper, written without the full academic paraphernalia, 
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the labour theory of value, and presents an alternative, neo-Polanyian analysis 
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I 
 
In the present time of financial crisis and economic downturn, there has been renewed interest 
in Marx’s thought and much discussion of its relevance to current problems. The interest 
centres, for obvious reasons, on his major economic treatise, Capital. That the three volumes 
of this work and the related manuscripts – the Grundrisse and Theories of Surplus Value – 
yield insights regarding both the periodic instability of capitalist economies and the 
maldistribution of the burdens of economic crisis is not to be doubted. At the same time, it is 
hard to think of a period since Marx’s death when Marxist movements and organizations in the 
world’s wealthiest countries were weaker than they are now. More generally, the global left is 
not well-stocked with practical strategies – strategies for moving towards alternative forms of 
economy and social organization – that look like being able to persuade Western electorates.  
 
The need for a critical renewal of Marx’s materialist theoretical legacy, and for its application to 
contemporary societies, is as pressing as it has ever been. Everywhere the material basis of 
human life is called to mind: in concerns about climate change; in problems of the availability 
and the cost of food; in issues of land use, the control of water, and the price of oil. The 
materialist conception of history, as it came to be called, may sometimes have been 
formulated one-sidedly by Marx, Engels and the first generations of their followers, but its 
focus on the material infrastructure of social and political order remains indispensable both for 
understanding where humankind now stands and for any realistic projection of how to maintain 
the movement of historical progress in forms that can be defended as increasingly just. 
 
One thing that is not helpful in this context, however, is a blank reassertion of the validity of 
Marx’s most central economic categories for the analysis of global capitalism. Capital remains a 
work of fruitful – particular – explanatory hypotheses: hypotheses regarding, for example, the 
underlying causes of instability and crisis, the tendency towards the concentration of capital, 
the persistent production and reproduction of unemployment, the restlessly innovative drive 
transforming and retransforming technical processes of production and, more generally, social 
relations at large, and the globalizing dynamic as capitalist imperatives are pressed across 
national and regional boundaries. It contains the wherewithal for explaining why the 
geographical limits sometimes imagined for capitalist markets can generally be offset by the 
creation of fresh consumer needs through the invention of new types of product. Marx may not 
have anticipated the full extent of this phenomenon, but he understood its potential. 
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On the other hand, the value theory that is central to the architecture of Capital and to the 
whole of Marx’s mature theoretical enterprise is not defensible. On his own account of things, 
Marx set out to ‘reveal the economic law of motion of modern society’1 and yet he could not 
show how labour-determined values, as defined and expounded in the first volume of his 
major work, were translated into the mechanisms of price and exchange in actual capitalist 
markets. This difficulty has long been known about under the name of the ‘transformation 
problem’. We mention the latter here only in passing, since it is our contention that the 
weaknesses of Marxian value theory are more fundamental and incapacitating than are 
captured by the statement of that problem. Still, the labour-value-price nexus within Marxian 
theory remains the site of a key difficulty for those who continue to affirm the validity of 
Marx’s central categories, and yet it is a difficulty all too often left unaddressed by them. 
 
We will cite as exemplifying this omission recent books by three veteran Marxists: Terry 
Eagleton, Frederic Jameson and David Harvey. These are writers of varied intellectual styles; 
they address their readers in different tones and idioms. We draw attention only to the 
common feature uniting them (apart, that is, from their being all writers of established 
reputation within the stream of contemporary Marxist thought). That common feature is that 
all three write as if the explanatory success of Marx’s theory of value for understanding 
capitalism needs no defence; as if it can just be taken for granted. 
 
The book by Terry Eagleton to be discussed here bears a title of rebarbatively totalizing 
implication: Why Marx Was Right. Despite the title, Eagleton does not in fact claim that Marx 
never went wrong. He allows in the book’s preface, as well as signalling here and there 
throughout, areas of doubt about or disagreement with Marx’s ideas. Eagleton’s purpose is no 
more, he says, than to take ten of the most standard criticisms of Marx and to try to refute 
them.2 Nowhere in this exercise, however, does Marxian value theory put in an appearance for 
analytical appraisal. Of course, Eagleton is not a political economist, and it may be thought 
acceptable for him to choose his themes according to what he knows most surely. Yet it is 
clear that he regards Marx as having provided, all in all, the best intellectual starting point for 
understanding modern capitalism, and it is hard to understand how this claim can be sustained 
without any defence of Marxian value theory. Sparing himself the effort of such a defence, 
Eagleton nonetheless lets slip that, as far as he is concerned, Marx’s concept of value may be 
taken as being valid. For, as he writes in the preface already mentioned, ‘Marx was the first... 
to show how it [capitalism] arose, by what laws it worked, and how it might be brought to an 
end’.3 The verb ‘to show’ is factive: Eagleton’s contention, therefore, is not one about what 
                                           
1 Karl Marx, Capital, Volume 1, Penguin, London 1976, p. 92. 
2 Terry Eagleton, Why Marx Was Right, Yale University Press, New Haven and London 2011, pp. ix-x. 
3 Why Marx Was Right, p. xi, emphasis ours. 
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Marx merely set out, or hoped, to do; it is a claim about what he putatively achieved. But that 
claim cannot be rationally defended except by a defence of the central notion with which Marx 
undertook to explain ‘by what laws’ capitalism worked. So there is a hole at the very heart of 
Eagleton’s book, purporting as it does to convince its readers why Marx was (mostly) right, but 
without any attempt to vindicate by argument the most pivotal concepts relied on by Marx in 
his presentation of capitalism. 
 
That book does at least have the merit of being written in a language which is clear and easy 
to comprehend. The same cannot be said of Frederic Jameson’s Representing Capital: A 
Commentary on Volume One. This is a commentary many readers will find impenetrably 
obscure and written as if addressed to a circle of initiates in some arcane cult. One of the few 
points it does register clearly, all the same, is the one we have identified in Eagleton: namely, 
that Marx exposed the inner laws governing the operation of capitalism. Jameson is explicit 
about what stands at the centre of these laws. ‘[T]he theory of value’, he writes, ‘... secures 
the existence, behind all appearances of price and market exchange, of those deeper laws 
which it is the vocation of Marxian theory to bring to light’.4 The vocation of Marxian theory – 
but does Marxian theory succeed in this vocation? One must make one’s way through more 
than a hundred pages of further abstruse commentary before discovering that the author will 
simply dodge the question. It is not his purpose, Jameson says, ‘to defend the “truth” of 
Capital from its anti-Marxist enemies’. (He betrays there, incidentally, a certain supposition 
about the qualifications he requires for inclusion of others within the Marxist fold.) It is not his 
purpose to do that, because Capital’s critics, Jameson declares, subscribe to a reflection theory 
of truth, whereas the work ‘stands or falls as the representation of a system’.5 That is it, all of 
it: the author’s entire attempt to deal with the issue of validating Marx’s most fundamental 
concept, a concept that according to his belief secures the existence of capitalism’s deeper 
laws. He brushes aside the issue with no more than a glancing reference to clashing 
epistemological assumptions. 
 
Finally, David Harvey who, like Eagleton and unlike Jameson, respects some norms of clarity of 
exposition, is similarly evasive. In his A Companion to Marx’s Capital he, too, is committed to 
the idea that, embracing science, Marx undertook ‘a mode of investigation and inquiry that can 
uncover the deep structure of capitalism’.6 As Harvey also refers to this structure, it is a ‘deep 
value structure’.7 Again, however, one is entitled to ask if Marx’s mode of investigation not 
only can but actually did uncover the deep structure of capitalism – a structure which might be 
shown to be significantly determinative of the relevant object of explanation (capitalism itself) 
                                           
4 Frederic Jameson, Representing Capital: A Commentary on Volume One, Verso, London 2011, p. 12. 
5 Representing Capital, p. 127. 
6 David Harvey, A Companion to Marx’s Capital, Verso, London 2010, p. 46. 
7 A Companion to Marx’s Capital, p. 33. 
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and consequently capable of explaining it. Harvey does address this question at one point, if 
only indirectly and whether or not he is aware that that is what he is doing. Observing that a 
price can be put on things which are not the product of labour, he writes: ‘if prices can be put 
on anything independent of their value, and if they can in any case quantitatively fluctuate all 
over the place independent of [labour-determined] value, then why is Marx so fixated on the 
labor theory of value?’ The answer Harvey gives to this question refers to the material basis of 
life, to the real transformation that labour effects upon nature and which is crucial to human 
existence. As he writes: ‘if everybody tried to live off the spectacle of waterfalls or through 
trading in conscience and honor, no one would survive’.8  
 
Intended as support for a specifically labour theory of value, this suggestion is philosophically 
inept. It appeals to entities and processes which certainly do include human labour and its 
transformative effects, but which include, as well, material inputs to the production process 
that are not productive of value according to Marx: natural resources, raw materials, tools, 
machines and so forth. Harvey’s answer to the question he himself poses, in other words, does 
not distinguish why, in Marx’s theory, the expenditure of human labour-power should, but the 
use of, say, horse power, or of the natural force of a river, should not, yield objective economic 
value. And this is as much as he has to offer in support of a thesis informing his entire 
presentation of Capital, the thesis that Marx found the way to uncovering capitalism’s deep 
structure. 
 
There is, to be sure, nothing wrong with the idea that in the social sciences explanation may 
uncover laws and/or structures which are not immediately visible to the participants in the 
social processes under investigation but are the product of research and analysis and the 
construction of theoretical hypotheses. But the mere enunciation of some supposed law or 
deep structure is not sufficient unto itself. Its claims to intellectual attention, to actually being 
explanatory of what it is thought to explain, requires an effort of argument, of following 
through to show how the surface appearances of social life (to put this in the way Marx himself 
sometimes put it) can be traced back to their determinant causes; or conversely to show how 
– that is, by what paths and mechanisms – these causes work through to the actual 
consequences, events, tendencies or what have you, of the real world. For two other 
possibilities have always to be considered than that an effectively determining and explanatory 
underlying structure has been identified. First, it is possible that the structure hypothesized 
does not exist and so can explain nothing. Second, it is possible that even though it does exist 
it either does not explain anything or does not explain what those invoking it think it explains. 
 
Both of these abstract possibilities are pertinent to the case in hand. Marxian value is defined 
                                           
8 A Companion to Marx’s Capital, pp. 60-61. 
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as being determined by the labour-time on average socially necessary in given conditions to 
reproduce some particular commodity, and prices are held by Marx to fluctuate around this 
value (in his simpler model) or to be governed by it in a more indirect but not fully specified 
way (in the more complex model). As readers of Capital will know, however, one crucial 
commodity, at the very centre of his account of exploitation, is labour-power itself, the 
capacity of the labourer to work. Apart from several other difficulties with Marx’s theoretical 
treatment of labour-power – difficulties we shall come to shortly – the value of labour-power is 
held by him to include a historical and moral element, since it is not a matter simply of brute 
natural fact what workers require in order to be in a ‘normal’ condition of health and capacity 
when presenting themselves ready for work; there is, as we might say today, a cultural 
component involved. But this means that identifying a value of labour-power that is, so to say, 
‘underneath’ its varying prices is no longer a viable enterprise. There is no determinate value 
of labour-power definable separately from the price of labour-power and its fluctuations – in 
other words, separately from actual wage levels – because it will be impossible to bypass the 
latter in settling what is the historical and moral component in the needs of the labourer.  
 
Even if this problem – a disabling circularity – did not exist, and value could be arrived at as 
Marx says it is, there is the second possibility to be faced: which is that, existent as they may 
be, labour-determined values do not uniquely determine price, because price is set by a 
number of factors, the labour-content of the commodity only one amongst them. Marx, as it 
happens, was perfectly well aware of this when he needed to be: he accepted that a produced 
object which is ‘useless’ (for which there is no demand) has no value at all, however much 
labour may be embodied in it.9 But he thought to restrict, without more ado, the influence of 
social utility and demand on the determination of value to that one effect. Why usefulness and 
effective demand may determine whether a commodity has any value at all but not, also, 
contribute to determining how much value it has, is a question to which he gave no persuasive 
answer. 
 
In any case, the books by Eagleton, Jameson and Harvey which we have referred to are as if 
innocent of the existence of such questions, while putting forth knowledge claims on behalf of 
Marx’s Capital that depend on the questions having been addressed and satisfactorily 
answered. From reading those three books one might think it were enough simply to assert 
that labour is the unique source of economic value, without having to go to the trouble of 
showing how prices in the real world are governed by labour-determined values. Yet unless 
this can be shown, Marx cannot have revealed ‘the economic law of motion of modern society’.  
 
                                           
9 ‘Finally, nothing can be a value without being an object of utility. If the thing is useless, so is the labour contained in 
it; the labour does not count as labour, and therefore creates no value.’ Capital 1, p. 131. 
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(We will digress here briefly in order to anticipate and respond to the suggestion that, contrary 
to the stubborn orthodoxy just illustrated by the work of the three writers we have discussed, 
Marx’s political economy can be upheld without reference to his value theory; that it 
constitutes a superior explanatory framework independently of that theory. Note that we 
ourselves earlier referred to some fruitful, if particular, aspects of Marx’s economic thought, 
and the above suggestion might be seen as an alternative version of that acknowledgement. 
Yet it is a much more modest claim on Marx’s behalf than the one we have been taking issue 
with up to now. That Marx was a percipient analyst of the political affairs and economic trends 
of his day has been widely remarked upon. Already in the Communist Manifesto, published 
nearly two decades before his mature theory of value was outlined in the first volume of 
Capital, he and Engels had written of capitalism in terms which now read in places as 
remarkably prescient about the processes of global capitalism.10 But whatever may be shown 
by excerpts from the Manifesto either about the advantages of Marx’s class analysis or about 
his grasp of some of the tendencies of capitalist development, this is something different from 
the claim we have been concerned with hitherto, according to which in his theory of labour-
determined value Marx was in possession of some sort of conceptual key to understanding 
capitalism, enabling him to lay bare the workings of that socio-economic formation. This 
longstanding thesis about the theoretical superiority of Marx’s conceptual schema is lost if the 
suggestion is now to be entertained that the labour theory of value is dispensable to his 
explanatory enterprise. That theory of value was not just a casual add-on to his account of 
class relations under capitalism that one might take or leave. It was intended by him to 
disclose the secret and central dynamic of the whole capital-labour relationship. If it does not 
do that, then Marx’s theoretical enterprise fails in a fundamental way. And so it does fail, as 
                                           
10
 ‘The bourgeoisie cannot exist without constantly revolutionising the instruments of production, and thereby the 
relations of production, and with them the whole relations of society… The need of a constantly expanding market for 
its products chases the bourgeoisie over the entire surface of the globe. It must nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, 
establish connexions everywhere. The bourgeoisie has through its exploitation of the world market given a 
cosmopolitan character to production and consumption in every country… it has drawn from under the feet of industry 
the national ground on which it stood. All old-established national industries have been destroyed or are daily being 
destroyed. They are dislodged by new industries, whose introduction becomes a life and death question for all civilised 
nations, by industries that no longer work up indigenous raw material, but raw material drawn from the remotest zones; 
industries whose products are consumed, not only at home, but in every quarter of the globe. In place of the old wants, 
satisfied by the production of the country, we find new wants, requiring for their satisfaction the products of distant 
lands and climes. In place of the old local and national seclusion and self-sufficiency, we have intercourse in every 
direction, universal inter-dependence of nations. And as in material, so also in intellectual production. The intellectual 
creations of individual nations become common property. National one-sidedness and narrow-mindedness become more 
and more impossible, and from the numerous national and local literatures, there arises a world literature. The 
bourgeoisie, by the rapid improvement of all instruments of production, by the immensely facilitated means of 
communication, draws all, even the most barbarian, nations into civilisation. The cheap prices of commodities are the 
heavy artillery with which it batters down all Chinese walls, with which it forces the barbarians’ intensely obstinate 
hatred of foreigners to capitulate. It compels all nations, on pain of extinction, to adopt the bourgeois mode of 
production; it compels them to introduce what it calls civilisation into their midst, i.e., to become bourgeois themselves. 
In one word, it creates a world after its own image.’ Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Manifesto of the Communist Party 
, Collected Works, Volume 6, Lawrence and Wishart, London 1976, pp. 487-8. And cf. Capital I, p. 617, where Marx 
refers to beginning of this passage. 
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we go on to argue in detail below. Referring to what Marx grasped, to his remarkable insights 
about capitalism, has also to be complemented by a recognition of what his account left out or 
understated or misdescribed. Marx may have understood about the drive towards 
commodification but he did not dwell on its limits, and this affects his central argument, as we 
in due course explain. It is a failure, furthermore, tied up with his whole treatment of the 
capitalist economy as a closed system obeying its own internal logic – a weakness of his theory 
to be highlighted in section II below.)   
 
We return to the main thread of our analysis. It is not difficult to understand why Capital and 
the account of value it contains acquired such a hold on communists, socialists and other 
activists of the left, and has retained a more general appeal to this day despite all its 
theoretical deficiencies. In his most simple portrayal, the concept of value is deployed by Marx 
to present in vivid terms a picture of capitalist exploitation. Labour-power is for him the sole 
source of value, and the capitalist purchases it for what it is worth, which is to say for the 
value of the commodities that go into keeping the worker alive and in a state fit to work, and 
then puts the purchased labour-power into operation. But in operation labour-power can 
produce more value than it has, and the capitalist sees to it that it does. This is the source of 
surplus-value – which is, for Marx, the inner essence of profit. In the difference between the 
value of labour-power and the value which labour-power in operation creates we have a direct 
and simple image of class exploitation in capitalist society. It is an image that has been useful 
for, loosely-speaking, didactic and political purposes. What is more, the first volume of Capital 
presents this image as though the exploitation of the working class by the capitalist class was 
a purely objective phenomenon, inscribed in the very nature of things. It lies within the 
structure of social and economic reality itself, without, apparently, being dependent on any 
normative judgement. The assumption that one’s own moral standpoint is an integral part of 
the universe is always a tempting one; it may be seen, for example, in religions for which the 
most important ethical injunctions and prohibitions are traceable to the will of God. If value is 
what Marx says it is, and exploitation is there willy-nilly in the very foundations of the capitalist 
social world, it is as though reality itself stands on the side of those opposing economic 
injustice. Reality – just like that, unadorned – is always a useful ally to have in political 
contestation. Marx’s Capital may be read, accordingly, as having provided a convenient and 
powerful myth, its theoretical failures notwithstanding. 
 
It is false, however, that what Marx offers is a purely objective definition of exploitation. His 
concept of exploitation depends on assumptions about who is entitled to what, who merits 
what rewards or benefits. That the worker is not the recipient of all the value he or she creates 
does not constitute a wrong unless one thinks that the worker ought to be able to appropriate 
all of it. We do not argue the point again here, but it can be shown textually – and it has been, 
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without having generated any persuasive riposte11 – that in his mature writings, including 
Capital, Marx did rely on precisely this supposition, even though there is also material in the 
same writings appearing to contradict it. 
 
The concept of labour-determined value is not only insufficient to establishing the existence of 
capitalist exploitation, it is also unnecessary to doing so. It is insufficient to that end because 
of its internal theoretical deficiencies and of the requirement, just mentioned, of 
supplementary normative assumptions. It is in addition unnecessary, because the performance 
of surplus-labour (in Marx’s terms) needs no translation into embodied values in order for one 
to be able to recognize that if some people in a society do not work, then others who do work 
must work beyond the point of providing what they need themselves; they must work, in 
addition, in order to cover what is appropriated by, or yielded up to, non-working others. Marx 
was himself perfectly well aware of this, since he held that all class societies are based on 
exploitation, while the existence of labour-determined values as embodied in commodities was 
a reality specific to capitalism. As he writes in volume one of Capital:   
Wherever a part of society possesses the monopoly of the means of production, the 
worker, free or unfree, must add to the labour-time necessary for his own maintenance 
an extra quantity of labour-time in order to produce the means of subsistence for the 
owner of the means of production...12 
So the idea of surplus-labour, and of surplus-product, can be articulated without any reference 
to the thesis that the value of commodities is determined by the labour socially necessary on 
average to reproduce them; even though it should be noted that, here as before, the bare 
existence of surplus labour does not suffice to establish that there is exploitation in a 
pejorative moral sense. For this, further argument is needed, argument about what justly 
belongs to whom, about what is the proper relationship between effort and reward, about 
equality, inequality and so on. 
 
Not only is Marx’s account of exploitation deficient in explanatory-theoretical terms; it is open 
to criticism, as well, on account of the normative assumptions it secretes. His condemnation of 
capitalist exploitation as unjust relies on the implicit premise that the rightful owners of 
produced values are the people who produced them. Yet Marx himself had indicated the 
shortcomings in this moral premise when he commended as a better principle, if only for a 
more remote communist future, the slogan ‘from each according to his ability, to each 
according to his needs’.13 The principle embodied in this latter slogan can only be seen as 
                                           
11 See Norman Geras, ‘The Controversy about Marx and Justice’, New Left Review 150, March-April 1985, pp. 47-85; 
and Norman Geras, ‘Bringing Marx to Justice’, New Left Review 195, September-October 1992, pp. 37-69. 
12 Capital 1, p. 344. 
13 Karl Marx, ‘Critique of the Gotha Programme’, in David McLellan (ed.), Karl Marx: Selected Writings, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford 1977, p. 569. 
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morally persuasive if individuals are not entitled to the entire fruits of their labour. A society, 
for example, that sets aside some portion of the product of the labour of the healthy and able-
bodied so as to provide for the ill and infirm, would count as unjustly exploitative if those 
capable of working were thought to have a rightful title to all of what they produced. Most 
people on the left, however, accepting, like Marx himself, that the claim of need here has some 
moral force, would not see such provision as exploitative or unjust. Noting this does not mean, 
of course, that a proportion of goods deducted from what is produced by those who work may 
legitimately be claimed by absolutely anybody. One may support provision for the sick without 
underwriting the principle that pure ownership of resources, in and of itself, should generate 
some title to a reward out of the overall labour product. In any event, in this regard also, 
Marx’s central vision in his major work is incomplete. It lacks the detailed argument necessary 
to sustaining a well-founded theory of exploitation and of its opposite – just distribution. We 
return to this point in section III. 
 
There is something of an irony in the contention (whether implicit or explicit) of contemporary 
Marxist writers that Marx’s analysis of capitalism was simply right, or at any rate right enough 
to be an unproblematic starting point for us today. For it is an attitude quite foreign to Marx’s 
own intellectual habits. He for his part attempted not only to master the political economy of 
his day but also to be abreast of the most contemporary developments in the societies whose 
dynamics he was seeking to understand. Frederic Jameson is so wedded to the notion that 
volume one of Capital is fons et origo that he writes as if, instead of Marxian theory having to 
adapt in the light of subsequent developments, these latter are already in some sort contained 
in what Marx wrote – which, if it were true, would make a certain sense of the almost biblical 
gaze which he (Jameson) practises towards that work. ‘It should not be surprising’, he declares 
in the opening words of his commentary, ‘that Marx remains as inexhaustible as capital itself, 
and that with every adaptation or mutation of the latter his texts and his thought resonate in 
new ways and with fresh accents – inédits as the French say – rich with new meanings’.14 
 
Against such frozen attitudes, there is a need, instead, to reconfigure the materialist approach 
to understanding history, contemporary capitalism included, in light both of the politico-
economic realities of the century and a half that have elapsed since Marx wrote and of the 
weaknesses in the original framework of ideas that he elaborated. In what follows, we hope to 
indicate the necessary direction this reconfiguration should take. Building on the work of Karl 
Polanyi, we argue that an ‘instituted economic process’ approach exposes the shortcomings of 
any attempt, such as is to be found in Marx’s work, to conceptualize the economy as a closed 
system, one that can be theorized separately from the political, legal and other co-realities by 
which it is instituted.  
                                           
14 Representing Capital, p. 1. 
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This is more than just a matter of the economy not being separately identifiable in abstraction 
from the politico-legal norms and structures that have a part in constituting it. As we go on to 
argue, the very determination of value itself, so crucial to Marx’s explanatory enterprise, 
depends upon political, legal and moral facts in the full variety of their specific historical 
shapes, so that the exchange of labour-power is never reducible to a single model of the kind 
sketched by Marx in Capital. Labour-power, cornerstone of his theory of value and exploitation, 
is not amenable to being described or theorized by reference to some standard, universalizable 
labouring-situation, which might then be captured in a mathematically expressible schema. For 
there is no transcendent situation of the labourer in capitalist economies, and one of the 
reasons there is not is that the circumstances of those who work and the pressure upon them 
to exchange their labour-power are never purely economic facts, as they might be within a 
closed economic system. The worker’s position within capitalist formations is subject to moral, 
legal and cultural constraints, which themselves contribute to defining the price for which the 
commodity labour-power is sold and the conditions under which and manner in which it may 
be used by its purchasers. 
 
Moreover, the production of labour-power cannot be treated as comparable to the production 
of other commodities. This is because part of the process of its production belongs outside the 
exchange economy, be it in the family where a gendered division of labour supplies ‘inputs’ not 
subject to determination by the market, or in educational institutions of one kind and another 
where the commodity labour-power takes on particular shapes that are not always readily 
substitutable for one another. The lack of uniformity in the specific substance of labour-power 
which is due to the imparting of education and differential knowledge and skills also means 
that the Marxian conception of labour-power’s being ‘used up’ by its purchaser (the employer) 
within the time period for which it is sold by the worker does not straightforwardly apply in real 
labour processes. Knowledge and skills are not fully spent, so to speak, in or by the process of 
labour; indeed they are often enhanced. They also constitute a resource for their owners, the 
sellers of labour-power, entailing, at least sometimes, a counter-balancing factor in the 
contract of exchange between capitalist and worker; and they are the site of resource 
differentials among workers themselves (if we refer thus to all those who sell their labour-
power for regular remuneration); owning nothing but one’s labour-power is not the same thing 
for those with expensive saleable skills as compared to those with none. The Marxian model of 
the ‘free’ labourer, too, understates the extent to which real capitalist societies, historically and 
to this day, have accommodated forms of more or less coerced labour, from plantation slavery 
to the trafficking of women and children for sexual and other types of exploitation. 
 
For all of these reasons, to be enlarged upon in the section that follows, there is no single and 
cresi.essex.ac.uk Page 14 of 53 © 2013, University of Essex 
universal measure, and no basis stretching across all forms of the capitalist economy, for the 
value of labour-power. That quantity is in truth – in real terms – the price for which the human 
capacity is sold, not something ‘behind’ or ‘beneath’ it. 
 
II 
‘Bourgeois society is the most developed and the most complex historic organization of 
production… Human anatomy contains a key to the anatomy of the ape.’15 
 
Marx’s view that historical change provides an epistemological standpoint enabling advances in 
understanding of both the present and the past rests in part on the persuasive idea that, in the 
absence of experimental manipulation of variables available to the natural sciences and for small-
scale human interactions, history itself provides adventitious variations of perspective from behind 
our backs. One might expect, therefore, that a century and a half of significant historical variation 
would have led to a new anatomical understanding of the political economies of the capitalist epoch 
and their development. Yet, perversely, there has been a persistent adherence to the core theoretical 
analysis contained in Capital; and one even finds, to turn the whole epistemology upside down, 
assertions that Capital has become more true of reality today than it was in its own time. We have 
already referred, in the previous section, to Frederic Jameson’s affirmation of this view, and it is 
indeed common to the three books discussed there. (See, for example, Jameson’s ‘ever more true’, 
Eagleton’s ‘truer as time passes’ and Harvey’s ‘the [contemporary] neoliberal counter-revolution… 
brilliantly deconstructed in the 1850s and 1860s’.)16 The past, it seems, has become a better vantage 
point for understanding the present than the present itself.  
 
Yet a telling clue for this analytical stasis may lie in Marx’s choice of the metaphor of ‘anatomy’, a 
relatively fixed skeletal structure. Moreover, Korsch
17
 and Harvey
18
 have observed that, in contrast 
to Marx’s political writings, the political economy of Capital is a system with a logic which, once 
historically in place as a new mode of production, follows its own unalterable laws, including crises 
of self-destruction.
19
 In Jameson’s frequently repeated language, the economy of Capital is 
                                           
15 Karl Marx, Grundrisse, Penguin/New Left Review, London 1973, p. 105. 
16 Respectively: Jameson, Representing Capital, p. 9; Eagleton, Why Marx Was Right, p. 115; and Harvey, A 
Companion to Marx’s Capital, p. 14, 
17 Karl Korsch, Karl Marx, Chapman and Hall, London 1938. 
18 Harvey, A Companion to Marx’s Capital.  
19 Thus, despite the historical character of capitalism itself, Marx sometimes even talks of its laws as akin to ahistorical 
laws of nature: ‘the labour-time socially necessary to produce them [commodities] asserts itself as a regulative law of 
nature. In the same way, the law of gravity asserts itself when a person’s house collapses on top of him.” (Capital 1, 
p. 168). Or again, of the law of increasing surplus immizeration: ‘The relative mass of the industrial reserve army thus 
increases with the potential energy of wealth... The more extensive, finally, the pauperized sections of the working 
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machine-like, a system whose course has been set by its defining preconditions.
20
 The radical 
novelty of Marx’s analysis was to propose that economic laws were not universal to all historical 
social formations: the laws of capitalism emerged after a historical transition and did not operate in 
previous modes of production. Economic laws thus proceeded in leaps, historical transitions, 
followed by the working through, over time, of the established laws of that mode of production. It is 
this enduring vision of a partially historical but then mechanical political economy that we subject 
to criticism in what follows. The historical political economy proposed here further develops the 
insight of an already part-historical explanatory framework by emphasizing a yet more radically 
historical and comparative understanding of political economy than is to be found in the classics 
(including Marx). Even evolutionary economics does not question whether or how processes of 
variation and selection may themselves radically change from historical epoch to epoch, as against 
the comparatively stable natural selection environments of biological organisms. 
 
Economic processes and their organization are thoroughly historical, including their dynamics and 
modus operandi, and political economy as a discipline needs to be accordingly historical. 
Developing the Polanyian conception of the ‘instituting’ of economic processes21 shows how 
economic causalities are emergent, immanent in their organization, their geographic scale and their 
temporal scope. So, as against a vision of economy where the inner workings of its laws become 
ever more manifest and hence correspond to abstraction in the theory, conceiving of economy as 
historically and geographically instituted processes assumes radical variation and multiple historical 
pathways. To suggest that causalities are immanent and emergent in economic organization, 
however, is not to promote pure contingency or chaos, a jumble of disordered histories. The 
connotation of ‘instituting’ and ‘de-instituting’ rather suggests that causalities evolve a varying 
geographical scale and temporal extension. In that sense, our conception of political economy and 
causality is a deepening, rather than rejection, of Marx’s conception of historical causality. 
 
Jameson, by contrast, proposes a more ‘dialectical’, even Hegelian, interpretation of Marx, 
suggesting a historical process whereby the abstract in thought (a political economic theory of 
capital) is in an interactive, dialectical relation with a historical process of reality itself becoming 
more abstract over time. Capitalism gradually becomes more homogenous and ‘pure’ over time, as 
                                                                                                                                            
class and the industrial reserve army, the greater is official pauperism. This is the absolute general law of capitalist 
accumulation.’ (Capital 1, p. 798) 
20 ‘Of Capital itself, we must say that it consists in the representation of a peculiar machine whose evolution is 
(dialectically) at one with its breakdown... its growth with its collapse... this demonstration is framed in terms of a 
system rather than of human agency...’ Representing Capital, p. 142. 
21 Karl Polanyi, ‘The Economy as Instituted Process’, in K. Polanyi, C. Arensberg and H. Pearson (eds.), Trade and 
Market in Early Empires, Free Press, Glencoe, IL, 1957, pp. 243-69. 
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in the polarization of classes or global fluxes of finance capital. So buttressing Jameson’s defence of 
the increasingly manifest truth of Marx, the historical process would then be one where abstraction 
in reality converges with the abstract in thought, as already represented in Capital. A less dialectical 
view of the abstractness of Marx’s model is one that contrasts the richness and variety of surface 
phenomena of capitalisms across the world, with some underlying shared generative mechanism 
underpinning all historical capitalisms and their development. Within this kind of interpretation, 
without dialectical overtones, capitalism can be seen to gradually universalize, until all economies 
of the world are absorbed into the same generative processes – capitalism as a globalizing economy, 
everything commodified, including the air we breathe, the water we drink and so on; Harvey’s 
super-commodification, achieved through ‘accumulation by dispossession’.22 
 
The radically historical political economy advocated here, however, treats scale, both temporal and 
spatial, as immanent in historically instituted organizations – configurations – of economic 
processes. So certain organizations of economic process develop more or less extensively over 
space and time, without there being a single generative motor with universalizing tendencies – a 
Model-T Capitalism, or an abstract model with undefined spatial and temporal scales, in relation to 
which all observed variations are surface phenomena. Moreover, the development and scale of 
economic organization can be seen to be an outcome of complex interactions between economic 
and political processes, with states being politically implicated to varying degrees in instituting 
economic organization. Political processes, especially through legal and fiscal interventions, are 
involved in the very constitution of economic organization, so requiring an integrated approach 
rather than a separation of spheres or disciplines, let alone a reversion to a base-superstructure 
dichotomy. Nowhere is this more clear than in the economic organization of labour, and it is to this 
that we now turn, in order to address the core concepts of Marx’s labour theory of value, the 
generation of inequalities, surplus value, and the accumulation of capital. 
 
A neo-Polanyian renewal of Marx’s analysis of labour-power in capitalist political economy 
 
Marx was undoubtedly correct to insist that labour is at the source of the creation of economic 
wealth, in whatever political economy, capitalist or pre-capitalist. His view is a permanent antidote 
                                           
22 Harvey speaks of ‘the wholesale commodification of nature’ and suggests that ‘[t]o presume 
that markets and market signals can best determine all allocative decisions is to presume that 
everything can in principle be treated as a commodity.’ David Harvey, A Brief History of 
Neoliberalism. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005, pp. 160, 165. 
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to accounts that one-sidedly treat markets – which also involve their own labour activities – as the 
stimulants and generators of wealth. He accords to labour, in all its variety, a privileged position, 
not just as one productive factor amongst others. We retain that vision. 
 
Represented at its most schematic, the initial conditions for the ‘motor’ of capitalism as 
characterized by Marx in volume one of Capital can be depicted as follows. In a much simplified 
form, the diagram below sets out the logic of capital, once in place, the unchanging and general 
laws of capital just referred to. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Division between 
owners of means of 
production and sellers 
of labour-power: class 
Workers have 
‘Nothing but 
labour to sell’ 
Production of surplus 
value, leading to 
accumulation of capital 
by owners of outputs of 
production 
Exchange of the 
capacity to work 
between 
workers and 
capitalists 
Labour produces 
commodities of 
greater total 
value than the 
exchange value of 
labour-power 
itself 
Exchange value of 
labour-power equal to 
commodities necessary 
to replenish labour-
capacity 
1 
2 
2 
3 
4i 
4ii 
4ii 
Exchange value of commodities 
equal to the labour time 
necessary to reproduce them. 
 The labour theory of value. 
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During the course of the subsequent analysis, we will be visiting and exploring each of these 
numbered links in the chain of a closed-commodity conception of the economy. In this diagram, 
however, an initial presupposition is held in abeyance for the sake of exploring the argument 
(though it will be questioned tangentially): namely, that all commodities have a price ultimately 
determined by the socially and technically necessary labour time for their production – the labour 
theory of value. We will return to examine that presupposition later, so as to concentrate first on the 
elements contained within Marx’s schema that contribute to ‘an economy of labour’: how labour-
capacity is produced/reproduced; the social organization of the parties to the exchange between 
‘capital’ and ‘labour’; the necessity of that exchange; what is exchanged and how it is priced; and 
how it is then used in production – all in a continuing process within the wider framework of 
capitalist political economies. Each of these aspects of the economy of labour is critical for the 
labour theory of value, and each requires fundamental development and revision from its 
formulation in Capital, the Grundrisse and Theories of Surplus Value. The argument to emerge in 
due course will be that economies of labour vary in space and time in these core aspects, and hence 
that there is no unchanging or spatially general law of capitalism with regard to the production of 
surplus value and capital accumulation. 
 
The production/reproduction of labour-power (see arrow 1) 
 
In Marx’s account of the production of labour-power in capitalist economies, the central analysis 
refers more to reproduction than production, and in particular to the consumption of those goods 
that are necessary for sustaining the social and biological existence of workers. As many, including 
Marx, have emphasized, the amount, variety and quality of those goods deemed necessary changes 
in the course of history, and may differ from one culture or country to another. It is a social and 
historical definition of ‘necessary’. Nonetheless, critically, whatever this bundle of goods, labour-
power is reproduced through the consumption of commodities produced under the market system of 
commodity production. The reproduction of labour-power is contained within the circuit of the 
commodity economy, and labour-power itself is also a commodity within those same circuits. This 
analysis therefore enshrines a conception of capitalist economies as a closed circuit system, and 
thereby postulates the economy itself as a closed system. 
 
Feminist critics have already demonstrated the need for a revision of this analysis, by highlighting 
the significance of non-market domestic labour, the bringing up of children and the continuing 
gendered division of labour within the household, for the reproduction of labour-power. 
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Reproduction of labour-power requires more than the consumption of commodities. The 
consequence of this critique is that labour-power, and its presence or absence on labour markets, is 
thoroughly and fundamentally gendered. Moreover, as most subsequent analysis has shown, there is 
no universal or historically static gendering of reproduction of labour-power: changes in the 
provision of child-care, the development of maternity leave, and a wide range of fiscal and policy 
instruments mean that this non-market process of reproduction of labour-power varies significantly 
from country to country, from historical period to historical period. The economic organization of 
reproduction is instituted in temporally and spatially varying ways. 
 
Nonetheless, non-market household reproduction of labour-power was present in Marx’s day and 
overlooked in his analysis. Since that time, too, a different kind of non-market labour has emerged 
on a significant and expanding scale. A major historical development has occurred requiring a shift 
of emphasis to include not only reproduction but also production of labour-power: the progressive 
emergence of universal and selective education.
23
 Obviously, one cannot criticize Marx for having 
ignored this, but latter-day Marxists who adhere to the formulations of Capital, clearly have not 
taken full advantage of their historical vantage point to revise the theory. Over the course of a 
century and a half, most ‘advanced’ economies have seen the time spent in schooling and education, 
and the devotion of public resources to it, expand more or less continuously. The patterns, structures 
and forms of this new production of skills and capacities also differ between countries, so again 
pointing to economies of production of labour-power varied in time and space. Although this will 
not be considered here, educational institutions constitute, as well, the basis of, and are engaged in, 
the production of new knowledge. 
 
Three important consequences flow from the consideration of these non-market forms of 
production/reproduction of labour-capacities. The first, and most obvious, is that significant swathes 
of the population are withdrawn from the labour market: compulsory education leads to children 
and young adults no longer being economically constrained to sell their labour, a point to which we 
return. The labour force has been fundamentally and continuously reshaped. Second, the non-
market production of labour-power breaks the commodity circuit, critical for establishing the 
dynamic portrayed in the diagram above. Labour-power is not reproduced through the consumption 
of commodities alone (hence its ‘value’ cannot be measured in terms only of the labour time 
involved in the production of these commodities). However factory-like school and university 
                                           
23 This is not to imply that education solely concerns the production of labour for the market: there is no functionalist 
or necessary process of adjustment between educational supply and market demand. More broadly, education also 
concerns development and reproduction of social relations, culture and polity. 
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systems may appear, the public owners of these ‘educational means of production’ do not sell their 
products (school leavers, graduates) as commodities on the market, not least because they do not 
own them. Likewise, the household as such does not produce or own labour as a commodity, in 
order to sell it on the market. There is a direct implication of these points, namely, that the work 
undertaken in the household or in the education system – and we must insist on both the work of 
teaching and the work of learning by schoolchildren and students – is never priced by markets.24 
There is no standard or process of establishing commensurability between non-market and market 
labour.  
 
A possible defence of the closed circuit economy might simply be that Marx’s version could be 
made to work in so far as one only considers the reproduction of labour-power through the 
consumption of commodities and brackets off the non-market as a separate sphere.
25
 However, to 
the extent that the skills developed and produced within education or households are essential for 
the production of commodities in the market economy, this bracketing just does not work. In short, 
we have to consider the economy as multi-modal at its core, with developing and variable 
interdependencies between market and non-market forms of production of labour-power. The 
dynamic of political economies that we call ‘capitalist’ requires consideration of non-market as well 
as market forces and pressures.  
 
Third, and consequently, it becomes critical to expand our understanding of the generation of 
inequalities to include unequal rights to public resources as well as commodity resources. For, just 
as much as the wage secures rights to commodities quite different from the rights of the owners of 
the means of production of commodities – to  profits, property, and so on – so educational systems, 
again in ways varied in space and time, generate unequal rights over public resources, say between 
a school leaver at age 16 and a university graduate at age 21. Educational systems are 
characteristically selective, creating instruments for determining the rights to differential access to 
public resources. That there is a combinatory intersection of inequalities over commodity and public 
resources, in wage hierarchies and labour market opportunities, only reinforces the importance of 
understanding capitalist economies in multi-modal terms. We have to get away from the idea that 
education merely reproduces class, if class is understood in the classical political economy terms of 
                                           
24 There might be all kinds of administrative attempts to measure ‘productivity’ of teachers or students – just as there 
are parallel attempts to achieve such measures for health care in hospitals, including cost setting. But there is no 
pricing by markets or market competition for outputs from different organizations. 
25 There are passages in Capital which suggest this possibility, those dealing with skilled labour, where the value of 
skilled labour is but a multiplication of simple labour, with the commodities consumed by trainers adding to the 
commodities consumed by trainees to form a composite exchange value of labour-power from an aggregate of the 
labour time involved in the total of commodities consumed by all those involved. 
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unequal rights over commodity resources. Educational systems and households are vehicles for 
generating and reproducing inequalities in skills and knowledge, within and across generations. 
 
The exchange of labour-power (see arrows 2 and 3) 
 
Marx wrote extensively about different aspects of the exchange of labour-power: the organization 
of the parties to the exchange; the necessity of exchange (arrow 2); what exactly was being bought 
and sold (arrow 3); and how the price of labour-power was determined (arrows 1 and 3). We deal in 
turn with each of these now, once more with the ambition of developing the analysis. Strangely – 
and surprisingly unremarked upon – Marx builds his argument for the labour theory of value around 
an assumption of an individual seller confronting an individual buyer under a condition of equality, 
at least before the law.
26
 This can be assumed to be partly because of how it fits within a more 
general argument that in exchange one person’s gain can only be through another person’s loss. 
Hence, Marx argued, the process of exchange cannot in general be a source of the generation of 
wealth, just a redistribution between individuals. Yet, as soon as one recognizes the social 
organization of owners of property, for example in the constitution of firms, and also institutions of 
property rights and inheritance, on the one side, and gender divisions, the shared characteristics of 
sellers of labour-power, the communities and combinations of workers – including, here, the history 
of crafts and guilds – on the other, this portrayal of an exchange between equal individuals appears 
fanciful, just as it is in much neo-classical and contemporary economics. Most significantly, it 
obscures the analysis of asymmetries of economic power in market exchange, and consequently of 
systemically unequal exchanges, which have, at the very least, redistributive consequences. One has 
only to think of the capture of value in value chains that results from the asymmetries of power 
enjoyed by UK supermarkets over small farmers, or by major end-product manufacturers like car 
producers over their suppliers, to recognize the importance of systemically unequal exchanges 
between different categories of economic agent. In these circumstances, unequal exchanges can 
redistribute wealth between classes of agent, so that it is not a question of one agent’s gain against 
an otherwise equal agent’s loss. The important thing to realize is that the exchange is entered into 
under a circumstance of inequality and asymmetry of economic power. The consequence of this is 
                                           
26 ‘He and the owner of money meet in the market, and enter into relations with each other on a footing of equality as 
owners of commodities, with the sole difference that one is a buyer, the other a seller; both are therefore equal in the 
eyes of the law.’ Or again, in the famous passage: ‘It is the exclusive realm of Freedom, Equality, Property and 
Bentham. Freedom, because both buyer and seller of a commodity, let us say of labour-power, are determined by 
their own free will. They contract as free persons, who are equal before the law... Equality, because each enters into 
relation with the other, as with a simple owner of commodities, and they exchange equivalent for equivalent. Property, 
because each disposes only of what is his own.’ Capital 1, pp. 271, 280. 
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that asymmetries of power in exchange systematically generate unequal rights to commodity 
resources.  
 
As for equality before the law, the assumption is historically quite fanciful for any of the European 
countries as they experienced industrial revolution. In the case of the United Kingdom, it took many 
decades, some would argue more than a century, before equality of contract was established in 
employment law. And even now one can remain legitimately sceptical about equality before the 
law. With whatever irony he may have portrayed it, equality in exchange was hard-wired into 
Marx’s analysis,27 and his analysis of markets in general takes for granted many of the assumptions 
advanced by economists who uncritically advocate the market economy. In developing a political 
economy of the exchange of labour, therefore, the major requirement is that the supposition of a 
universal condition of exchange has to be abandoned in favour of a historical and spatial analysis of 
the socio-economic organization of the parties to the exchange, underpinning the dynamics and 
inequalities of exchange. 
 
Arising directly from Marx’s analysis is the emphasis on the necessity – Marx uses the term 
‘compulsion’ – for the exchange to take place, in a way that does recognize two classes of economic 
agent: owners of money (potentially capital) and owners of labour-power. Marx has a strange 
formulation of the double freedom of the wage labourer: on the one hand, the free ownership of his 
or her labour-capacity; on the other hand, freedom from, that is, deprivation of, any objects that 
might otherwise ensure the worker’s continued existence as a living being.28 There are two major 
revisions required to develop this understanding of the constraint, or compulsion, to sell labour-
power. The first concerns the nature of the economic constraint: the absolute dichotomy between 
owners of means of production (in the first instance, money) and owners of labour-power deprived 
of all objects other than labour-power to sell. The second puts in question whether the constraint to 
sell can, in fact, be seen as purely economic: to sell and survive or not to sell and to die.
29
 
 
                                           
27 For example, the individual seller of labour-power, Marx writes, ‘must be the free proprietor of his own labour-
capacity.’ Capital 1, p. 271. 
 
28 ‘... this worker must be free in the double sense that as a free individual he can dispose of 
his labour-power as his own commodity, and that, on the other hand, he has no other 
commodity for sale, i.e. he is rid of them, he is free of all the objects needed for the 
realization... of his labour-power.’ Capital 1, pp. 272-3. 
29 The worker ‘must rather be compelled to offer for sale as a commodity that very labour-power which exists only in 
his living body.’ Capital 1, p. 272. 
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There is considerable ambiguity in Marx’s text, for he does certainly consider, on the one side of 
the exchange, labour-power as comprising all the mental and physical attributes of a living being,
30
 
but then equally emphasizes the absence of all other objects necessary for survival. On the other 
side of the exchange there is a parallel emphasis on ownership of physical assets, money, 
commodities and eventually physical means of production. So, the contrast or dichotomy is drawn 
between owners of means of purchase of commodities and owners of nothing other than a capacity 
to produce commodities, a static and absolute division of rights over commodity resources.  
 
We have already seen that the economic compulsion does not exercise its force equally on men and 
women, because of various and developing divisions of labour, market and household. But this is 
not to diminish the understanding that there is indeed a constraint or dependency on selling labour, 
as a dominant form in a wage-labour economy of labour. However, the economic force of mutual 
dependency on buyers and sellers of labour, the asymmetric power relation between them that binds 
them into making exchanges, is far from static or universal in form. Again, the issue of knowledge 
and skills requires a theoretical shift. It is worth dwelling for a moment on Marx’s exact words, a 
kind of possessive individualism in which the seller of labour owns his own ‘mental and physical 
capabilities existing in the physical form, the living personality, of a human being’. An argument 
might be – has been31 – mounted that the abstract individual is itself only a product of capitalist 
historical development, and that the theory is postulating such a being only as an unfolding outcome 
of this history. The difficulty with the argument is that the possessive individualism of labour-
power is a critical theoretical component both identifying the initial conditions of capitalist 
economic growth and underpinning the theoretical edifice of a universalising capitalist logic of 
accumulation, as outlined above. It is the ‘commodity’ labour-power which the owner may under 
compulsion sell to the capitalist: ‘mental … capabilities existing in physical form’. We will come 
back to this when examining the use or consumption of labour-power in production. 
  
But what is critically missing here are the skills and knowledge of knowledge-bearers: they may be 
deprived of necessary tools and equipment and all other means of producing means of subsistence. 
But workers have knowledge. They have skills. And it may be that capitalists have all the physical 
means of production, because they can purchase those with money and acquire full property rights 
over them; but given that those physical means of production depend entirely for their conception, 
                                           
30 ‘We mean by labour-power, or labour-capacity, the aggregate of those mental and physical capabilities existing in 
the physical form, the living personality, of a human being, capabilities which he sets in motion whenever he produces 
a use-value of any kind.’ Capital 1, p. 270. 
31Jameson, Representing Capital. 
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design, implementation and maintenance on bodies of knowledge and skills, it is difficult to argue 
that this body of knowledge, and the technical skills allied with it, are not also a means of 
production. Setting aside, in this argument, the major significance of the public stock (not capital) 
of knowledge, and complex interactions between that and technological knowledge,
32
 knowledge of 
the means of production is itself part of the means of production. And owners of the physical 
means, the fixed and circulating capital, are not owners of the knowledge as such, but at most hire 
its use in production.  
 
On the other side of the exchange, that of the sellers of the use of their knowledge, crucially, 
individuals do not own skills or knowledge in the way they own commodities. Indeed – though this 
is an argument that cannot be fully developed here – as individual bearers of knowledge, they no 
more own collective skills and knowledge than they own the language they speak, also only as 
individual speakers or as ‘bearers’ of languages. Here we are treating the significance of this 
exclusively from the angle of the constraint to exchange, the mutual dependency between buyers 
and sellers of labour-power. The key implication deriving from it is that the force of the mutual 
dependency between buyers and sellers of labour-power, the nature of the asymmetry of economic 
power, shifts with the growth and distribution of knowledge amongst the sellers of labour-power. 
To put it bluntly, the owners of physical capital hire labour under a force of compulsion to obtain 
the use of skills necessary to create and mobilize that capital. Conversely, the sellers of specialized 
scientific or technical labour-power in Silicon Valley are under a different force of constraint than 
migrant rural workers entering into waged labour in Ghuangzhou Province today, or indeed in 
Engels’s Manchester in the early 19th century. One further point before leaving this economic 
dimension of the compulsion to exchange: any division of labour creates a necessity to exchange 
between those who produce different commodities. If some workers produce bread and others 
butter, there is a necessity to exchange if people are to butter their bread, and wages (and, more 
widely, money) are a generalized means to enable such exchanges. People are under a compulsion 
to exchange wages for goods to sustain their customary ways of life.
33
 However, the necessity 
arising from interdependencies across divisions of labour are of a different kind from the necessities 
arising from divisions of wealth and resources, typified by the division between employers and 
workers. Marx is right to that extent. But then, in this respect, labour is not a commodity just like 
                                           
32 See, for example, D.C. Mowery and N. Rosenberg, Paths of Innovation: Technological Change in 20th Century 
America, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1998. 
33 Of course, within this overall compulsion to exchange for some goods or other, there may be considerable ‘freedom 
of choice’ as to what to buy and from whom. But even that relative freedom is subject to spatial and historical 
variation. The shopper in the UK makes choices within an organization of retailers and retailer power in 2011, quite 
different outlets from those characteristic of Italy or Norway in 2011 or the UK in 1950. There are no pure individual 
freedoms of choice, abstracted from the historically instituted organizations of exchange. 
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others, and the force of the compulsion to exchange is different from that to buy commodities. 
Moreover, this is only a first point to mark the fact that labour is not a commodity like others. So 
Marx’s analysis needs revision when he places such explanatory weight on the fact that it is a 
commodity like any other. 
 
So far it is the specifically economic dimension of constraints to exchange, arising from 
asymmetries of economic power and interdependencies, that has led us to this point of difference 
between labour and other commodities. That difference is significantly amplified once we introduce 
the political dimensions (legal and fiscal) of constraints to exchange. Throughout the uneven 
emergence of industrial capitalisms, law and fiscal instruments have fundamentally conditioned this 
most political of exchanges. Laws on movement of people, vagrancy, settlement, and laws of 
contract of employment; poor relief and welfare to incentivize or penalize moves into wage labour – 
both legal and fiscal conditions have been critical in shaping the compulsion to exchange. For 
example, and notoriously, the Poor Law Reform in England in 1834 criminalized those refusing 
work, so adding significantly to any economic compulsion to sell one’s labour. We cannot give a 
detailed empirical account here, but these fiscal and legal frameworks have continuously co-
evolved alongside, and in interaction with, the emergent economic organization of relations of 
exchange, differentially affecting both the gendering of that compulsion and child labour, as well as 
the exchange of labour in general. And of course, this politicized compulsion to exchange is still 
changing to this day, and doing so in radically different ways, even across European economies of 
labour (for example, ‘workfare’). The dynamics of exchange cannot be understood from within an 
abstracted economy, an economy as it would otherwise be in the absence of legal and fiscal 
frameworks. For that is to ascribe autonomy, as against specificity, to economic processes. The 
dynamics of exchange are interdependently economic and political at ‘ground level’, as it were – at 
the constitutive core of capitalist political economies. 
 
Given that there is exchange, a key question is: what is bought and sold in economies of labour? 
Marx went to great pains (and, in Theories of Surplus Value, to great length) to insist that wages 
were exchanged for the capacity to labour: for labour-power rather than for the actual labour 
performed (Ricardo), or for the value of the goods labour produced. It is this capacity to labour, 
labour-power, which has a value and ultimately a price, linked to the costs of its reproduction, 
especially that bundle of commodities socially necessary to sustain a given standard of living. 
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Clearly, the issue identified by Marx, of what is being exchanged, is of central importance to any 
analysis of capitalist economies. However, there are many ambiguities in his thinking, and also 
notable failures to analyse just how different labour-power is from any other commodity in terms of 
what is exchanged. Put at its sharpest, the exchange of property rights over most non-labour 
commodities is typically absolute: in exchange for money, the new owner of the commodity has 
complete control over the object of exchange and can do what they like with it. The person who 
sells it, retains no further rights or control over it. But it is important to distinguish between hiring 
any other good and hiring labour. Labour is different in two key aspects: the nature of the property 
rights exchanged, and how these are manifest in property rights over knowledge within economies 
of labour.  
 
As a point of entry on the issue of property rights, we can take Marx’s early formulation in Capital, 
where he seems to suggest that the only difference between wage labour and slavery is that the 
former is a time-delimited sale, whereas the latter is for life.
34
 Putting aside for one moment the 
issue of the exchange in the first case being between the purchaser and the worker, the second being 
between one slave owner (or trader) and another, this suggests that the exchange of property rights 
is absolute, as with any other commodity – and as fits with the labour theory of value. But Marx is 
equivocal on the point, for he immediately insists that if the worker only sells his commodity 
temporarily, he consequently retains the right of ownership over it, in order to be able to sell it on 
successive occasions. It is only an equivocation – what is sold is, as we shall see, then used up, so 
that a new quantum of labour-capacity then becomes available for sale, once restored. But Marx is 
also equivocal in another way, when he speaks not of the sale of labour-capacity as such, but of 
rights to use labour-power for a delimited time. This is different from purchasing a commodity with 
total rights over it, and then using it; it is purchasing rights to use a commodity, as against 
purchasing that commodity and then using it. In short, it is like hiring; and here we indeed find 
Marx likening the purchase of labour-power to hiring a horse for the day. But then he uses exactly 
the same terminology when saying that the right to use a commodity such as labour is no different 
from buying oil and then using it. In sum, confusion.  
 
So the first step forward is to be clear that we are talking about hiring, rather than selling, and that 
what is exchanged is a right to use labour-power, not labour-power as such, as the commodity. But, 
                                           
34 The sale of the labour-power, Marx writes, is for a ‘limited period only’, otherwise if sold forever, the worker would 
be ‘converting himself from a free man into a slave, from an owner of a commodity into a commodity.’ Capital 1, p. 
271. The same point is put much more simply, in pamphleteering mode, in Value, Price and Profit: ‘What the working 
man sells is not directly his Labour, but his Labouring Power, the temporary disposal of which he makes over to the 
capitalist... If allowed to do so for any indefinite period whatever, slavery would be immediately restored.’ Karl Marx 
and Frederick Engels, Collected Works, Volume 20, Lawrence and Wishart, London 1985, p. 128. 
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then, we have to go on to ask, is there a significant difference – where Marx insisted there was none 
– between hiring a commodity (such as a horse or a car) and hiring a worker? And there are two 
issues here, a specifically economic one, and a legal and normative one. For, once we start speaking 
of rights to use, we are also speaking of retained control by the owner of the used commodity 
during the period of hire, after the exchange. When an owner of a horse hires it out, they retain 
some control, stipulated by agreement, over what may or may not be done to the horse (such as not 
turning it into horsemeat). In more recent history, there might be laws against cruelty that limit the 
rights of use over the horse and protect the hirer of the horse. But once we have redefined the 
general nature of what is purchased as hire of the use of labour-power, the significance of 
ownership of the labour-power comes to the fore. A horse never hires out itself. A wage worker 
does. The issue of rights over use of a horse is between the hirer and the owner of the horse, and an 
agreement over rights between them, not an agreement with the horse. Labour is the only 
‘commodity’ that hires itself, and thereby is ever in a position to resist or go along with how use is 
made of it.  
 
Workers have at least the possibility, though often limited, of exercising control over how they are 
used, in a way that no other hired commodity does. There is a difference (not a spatially universal or 
historically static one) between hiring a horse and hiring a worker. This is talking abstractly and in 
specifically economic terms of levels and possibilities of control over use. A whole literature exists, 
in labour process studies, of how those possibilities are realized – a contestation over control that is 
ever present, whether overtly or latently. But, as with the compulsion to exchange, these specifically 
economic aspects of control over use, clearly reflecting balances of economic power, have in reality 
been accompanied by legal norms of contract, defining expectations and the limits of rights over 
use. And these have been constantly evolving in conjunction with changing organizations of 
employment. In a nutshell, what is exchanged – rights over use – is variable both historically and 
geographically. Property rights over labour as an object of purchase are an instituted phenomenon, 
and the nature of the rights over use of labour-power, what is bought and sold in economies of 
labour, is not a universal, just like every other, from the dawn of the industrial revolution until the 
present. Put simply, what is sold in Lyons in 2013 is not the same thing as what was sold in 
Manchester in 1840; it is not the same set of rights. 
 
Nowhere is the difference in rights over the use of labour-power more evident than in the rights 
over the use of knowledge and skills. For here we mark a sharper difference again from hiring 
horses or cars, or any other good. Marx talks of the labour-power being alienated, or sold, 
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transferred from seller to buyer, for use in production. We have just established that at most we can 
talk of purchasing the rights to use of a knowledge or skill. Going one step further, we now note 
that the worker hires out that knowledge, not as its owner, but as the bearer of a collective or social 
good, which is not itself produced or exchanged as a commodity. A key element to the dynamic of 
economies of labour is not for sale. For the hiring of the rights to the use of knowledge to occur – a 
market transaction – there is a collective non-commodity, knowledge, retained by the bearers of 
knowledge, shared and validated by communities in diverse ways, as historical and geographically 
varied forms of public good. That is to say, at the heart of the exchange of property rights within 
capitalist economies of labour, there are interdependent market and non-market rights over 
resources. How this interdependence develops, how the collective, non-market goods of knowledge 
and skills develop alongside their use for the production of commodity goods is at the core of any 
dynamic of capitalist economic development. The purchasing (or hiring) of labour-power cannot be 
understood as a simple purchase (or hire) of a commodity, with labour-power a commodity exactly 
like any other within a closed circuit of commodity production, exchange, distribution and use. 
 
We turn now to the price of labour-power. In the labour theory of value, the price of labour is 
related to the price of the commodities bought by the wage, commodities socially necessary for the 
reproduction of labour-power. As a consequence of the above analysis of the (re)production of 
labour-power, and of how and what is exchanged in the hiring of labour-power, this conception of 
price of labour-power is seen to be inadequate. The value of labour-power cannot be conceived in 
terms merely of the amount of socially necessary labour time involved in the production of that 
basket of commodities. As surplus value, the basis of profit and capital accumulation, rests on the 
difference between the values produced by the use of labour-power in production and the value of 
labour-power itself,
35
 we have lost half of the critical equation. And there is no such thing as an 
equation with only one half. 
 
Moreover, as we have already indicated, labour-time as the foundation of value is part of a theory of 
the relationship between price and value; and, in the case of non-market goods and services, we 
have no price. Consequently, we have no quantitative relationships through which to relate amounts 
of socially necessary labour time, partly because in a closed circuit commodity economy price 
competition is required to establish what amounts of labour time are socially and technically 
                                           
35 In Value, Price and Profit (written in 1865), Marx comes perilously close to suggesting – though this is clearly a 
simplification for the purposes of popularization – that a horse produces surplus value, inasmuch as the socially 
necessary time for the production of the food to keep the animal energetic is less than the time-in-productive-use of 
the horse. This only underscores the point made above concerning the reproduction of the existence of labour-power 
through consumption of socially necessary goods. Collected Works 20, p. 130. 
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necessary to produce any given commodity. So we have no means of establishing the socially 
necessary labour time for the production of knowledge, for example, as there is no process whereby 
the production of a given knowledge is compared with another through market competition, and as 
mediated by price. Fortunately. It follows that the price of purchasing the rights to the use of labour-
power, and of the knowledge of the knowledge-bearers, cannot be related to an underlying, and 
independent, quantity of necessary labour-time. So, the labour theory of value does not work for 
labour-power itself. The absence of an independent standard to which to relate price means that one 
cannot speak of selling labour-power above or below its value, if by that is meant, its independent 
underlying value. On the other hand, as we have already seen, economic power in exchange 
generates systemically unequal rights to commodity resources. 
 
We note in passing here that we both once subscribed to the notion of the fetishism of commodities, 
under which price as a real phenomenal appearance, is underpinned by value and generated by deep 
structures – socially and technically necessary labour time – behind the screen of appearances. 
Having long since rejected Marxian value, however, we have not repudiated the view that there are 
processes behind the phenomena of price in market exchange that determine price. We have 
pointed, on the contrary, to economic power asymmetries and the relative organization of the parties 
to the exchange as one of the most significant of these. 
 
In attempting to develop the understanding of economies of labour, we have argued that in terms of 
the production and organization of exchange, of property rights, and what it is that is exchanged, 
spatially and historically located dynamics are involved. By contrast, the ‘full monty’ labour theory 
of value entails that across the capitalist world ultimately the same underlying measure of labour-
determined value, as the basis of the price of labour, is at work. In fact, prices need to be considered 
as historically and spatially located aspects of market organization, rather than just monetary 
quantities. If we compare the way that labour is priced in France, for example, with how it is priced 
in the UK, we find immediate and striking contrasts. In the UK, we have multiple institutions of 
price, in public and private sectors, firm-specific price systems, spot prices, sector price hierarchies, 
international labour market prices, and so on. In France, within the salariat, we have one national 
salarial grid across industries, related directly to established criteria of qualification. So labour 
circulates across France, and across industries there, within the same price-quality nexus. And of 
course, both countries have witnessed significant and continuing changes to their price institutions. 
So, here too, what is needed in a renewal of the analysis of economies of labour, is a spatially and 
historically complex understanding of pricing of labour within the dynamics of production, 
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exchange and use of labour-power in those space-time frames. There is no transcendent, underlying, 
universal-capitalist measure, or independent basis, of the price of labour-power. 
 
The use of labour-power in production (see arrows 4i and 4ii) 
 
If we retain a vision of the centrality of labour to the creation of wealth, the primary process of 
maximizing the benefits to the employer of exploiting the rights to the use of labour-power is 
undoubtedly the production of outputs – commodities – at a higher value than the cost of inputs. 
The generation of profits and the accumulation of capital for growth, what happens within the firm 
or organization of firms in value chains through the use of labour is critical. Much attention in the 
literature has been paid to the labour process in terms of surveillance and control, Taylorism and de-
skilling, on the one hand, and resistance and coping strategies by workers (including skilled 
workers) in the face of this control and work intensification, on the other.
36
 Perhaps insufficient 
attention has been paid to the creativity of labour (innovation), the exploitation of imagination, 
knowledge and skills in both overall organization (firms, value chains, complex and multiple 
divisions of labour) and outputs of the labour process. We are convinced that the difference between 
the costs of inputs in production and the aggregate prices of outputs – the generation of profit – is in 
significant, although not exclusive, part a consequence of value creation in production by the use of 
labour-power and its varied organization. But it is beyond the scope and intention of this reflection 
on economies of labour to address the processes of profit generation, however important, to the 
labour theory of value. Rather, we limit ourselves to highlighting how the concept of surplus value 
is inadequate for an understanding of profit generation, as a consequence of Marx’s conception of 
the use of labour-power in production. 
  
The problems with treating the production of labour-power as a process of consumption of a 
socially and historically necessary basket of commodities have already been pointed out. Critical as 
this is to a surplus-value account of profit generation, Marx closes the circle of commodity 
production and consumption outlined in our earlier diagram with his account of what happens to 
labour-power when used in production. Again, there are ambiguities and confusions in Marx’s own 
struggle with conceptualization. For he slips from talking of the basket of commodities necessary 
for the reproduction of labour-power to talking of that necessary for the reproduction of the 
                                           
36 In Marx’s terms, this is related to the progression from formal to real subsumption of labour-power that is the 
historical development of control to maximize the production of surplus value from the formal rights of control over 
labour-power in production. 
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existence of labour-power.
37
 And by that he seems in places strongly to indicate biological 
existence.
38
 From there the circle is closed in production by a suggestion that physical and mental 
exhaustion, consumption of labour-power as the using up, in addition to use of, labour-capacity, is 
what occurs in production.
39
 In that respect again, labour-power is likened, as we have earlier seen, 
to the using up of other commodities in production: raw materials (for example, oil) and machinery. 
There is an expenditure of ‘vital forces’.40 The living being is physically and mentally depleted, 
exhausted, by work and then restored by consumption of food, clothing, housing, heating – and TV, 
I-phones, MP3s, etc, etc.
41
 And this link in the chain is what ties reproduction with consumption of 
labour-power within a closed commodity circuit. So, however ambiguous and open to 
interpretation, it is difficult to understate the role of this conception in the theory – it is an 
indispensable link in the analytical chain. 
 
And of course, there is much that is convincing in Marx’s account, and not to be jettisoned. People 
do need to eat – even eat well – to live, and thereby to work. But again we come back to the 
knowledge of the knowledge-bearers, and now to its use in production. It certainly is used, but 
equally certainly it is not, in the other sense of the word and by contrast with raw materials, used up. 
The biological brain may become physically tired, but the ideas and knowledge do not. There is a 
strong argument, indeed, that knowledge and skills are enhanced, even developed in use, and 
(again) collectively. Undoubtedly, such knowledge enhancement or development, knowledge 
outputs, may well be appropriated by the employers of the bearers of knowledge, through 
intellectual property rights. But the difficulties of employers in ensuring the kind of property rights 
                                           
37 ‘Labour-power exists only as a capacity of the living individual. Its production consequently presupposes his 
existence. Given the existence of the individual, the production of labour-power consists in his reproduction of himself 
or his maintenance. For his maintenance he requires a certain quantity of the means of subsistence. Therefore the 
labour-time necessary for the production of labour-power is the same as that necessary for the production of those 
means of subsistence; in other words, the value of labour-power is the value of the means of subsistence necessary 
for the maintenance of its owner.’ Capital 1, p. 274. As a small, but important point, for most non-biological 
commodities this distinction between existence and quality of a commodity is of no importance. In the case of 
biological organisms, the distinction between what is necessary for continued biological existence and for capacities to 
work is of great importance: the first may be all that is required for horse meat; the second may require considerable 
additional investment in training a horse to plough, in ‘breaking’ it, etc. And the importance of that distinction 
becomes yet greater when considering humans and labour-capacity. 
38 ‘We mean by labour-power, or labour-capacity, the aggregate of those mental and physical 
capabilities existing in the physical form, the living personality, of a human being, capabilities 
which he sets in motion whenever he produces a use-value of any kind.’ Capital 1, p. 270.  
39 ‘[L]abour-power becomes a reality only by being expressed; it is activated only through labour. But in the course of 
this activity, i.e. labour, a definite quantity of human muscle, nerve, brain, etc. is expended, and these things have to 
be replaced... His means of subsistence must therefore be sufficient to maintain him in his normal state as a working 
individual.’ Capital 1, pp. 274-5. 
40 ‘We say labour, i.e. the expenditure of his vital force... is the expenditure of labour-power in general.’ Capital 1, p. 
296. 
41 ‘The ultimate or minimum limit of the value of labour-power is formed by the value of the commodities which have 
to be supplied every day to the bearer of labour-power, the man, so that he can renew his life-process… the limit is 
formed by the value of the physically indispensable means of subsistence.’ Capital 1, pp. 276-7. 
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over this knowledge that they typically have over other outputs, given that it also resides in the 
knowledge-bearers, are also well known. And, to conclude this point concerning the use of labour-
power in production, if knowledge is used, but not used up, in production, it is not in need of 
restoration, and certainly not by the consumption of anything one might like to put in a basket of 
commodities. So, this final link in the chain of a labour-theory-of-value understanding of surplus 
value production is also broken, in a way calling for further development of the analysis of 
economies of labour. 
 
The main direction of such a development, as with the other aspects of economies of labour, needs 
to be towards looking at the overall social organization of labour, as a historically and spatially 
variable process. The exploration and analysis of interdependent uses of labour, market and non-
market, across the spectrum of the economy, is required in a shift of focus, and in a shift in the 
conception of ‘the economy’. The idea of a closed-commodity system, in which a physical capacity 
shared by all human-biological beings
42
 is used up in production, encourages thinking about the 
economy as following an initial logic whereby the motor is set in place and then universalizes 
towards globalized capitalism. It is this conception that needs fundamental revision and renewal. 
 
The homogeneity of labour 
 
At the outset of this analysis of economies of labour, an assumption was held in abeyance 
concerning the homogeneity of labour. There is an implication that may be drawn according to 
which, because all human products are the products of labour and that is the only thing they share in 
common, there must be such a thing as common labour, abstract labour, labour in general – and all 
such homogeneous labour can be quantified by time.
43
 This leads to the assumption that there is an 
underlying, independent, commensurable labour forming the basis of the commensurability of 
commodities: value as distinct from, yet forming the basis of, price. However, it simply does not 
                                           
42 There is a strand within Marx that has been echoed in debates on de-skilling and suggests that capitalism has a 
historical tendency to reduce labour-capacity to simple physical capacities, prone to nothing but physical exhaustion in 
its productive use: ‘The distinction between higher and simple labour, “skilled labour” and “unskilled labour”, rests in 
part on pure illusion or, to say the least, on distinctions that have long since ceased to be real, and survive only by 
virtue of a traditional convention; and in part on the helpless condition of some sections of the working class, a 
condition that prevents them from exacting equally with the rest the value of their labour-power. Accidental 
circumstances here play so great a part that these two forms of labour sometimes change places. Where, for instance, 
the physique of the working class has deteriorated and is, relatively speaking, exhausted, which is the case in all 
countries where capitalist production is highly developed, the lower forms of labour, which demand great expenditure 
of muscle, are in general considered as higher forms, compared with much more delicate forms of labour; the latter 
sink down to the level of simple labour.’ Capital 1, p. 305 
43 For example: ‘As the exchangeable values of commodities are only social functions of those things, and have 
nothing at all to do with their natural qualities, we must first ask, What is the common social substance of all 
commodities? It is Labour. To produce a commodity a certain amount of labour must be bestowed upon it, or worked 
up in it. And I say not only Labour, but social Labour.’ Value, Price and Profit, Collected Works 20, p. 121. 
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follow from all products having in common that they are produced by labour that qualitatively 
different forms of labour are less different than qualitatively different forms of commodities. In 
Marx, if we disregard for a moment the issue of ‘horizontal’ qualitative differences – say, between 
bricklaying and carpentry – there is also an analytical and empirically brutal assumption that 
complex labour – high skills – is no more than some quantifiable multiple of simple skills, and that 
all labour can be therefore, in some measurable way, equated to a function of simple labour.
44
  
 
Turning to horizontal qualitative differences, there are enormous assumptions made in trying to 
equate an hour of one type of labour with an hour of another. Even under the most Taylorized 
production systems, with task simplification, time measurements in general extend over a very 
small range of the total division of labour within an organization – mostly, restricted to assembly 
line production or mechanically and automatically regulated labour performance. And then any 
such measurement is non-transferable to assembly lines in general, to call centres in general, or any 
other such routinized forms of work. So neither horizontal nor vertical qualitative differences in 
labour can be assumed, without more ado, to be just variable quanta of a homogenous substance, 
abstract or simple labour. Empirically, the growth of capitalist political economies, in the market 
sector alone let alone the non-market sector in a multi-modal economy, has witnessed a 
proliferation and increasing complexity of interdependencies between both vertically and 
horizontally different kinds of labour. The idea of a progression towards greater homogeneity and 
simplicity of types of labour is both fanciful and erroneous, given the realities. In sum, a leap from 
the observation that all products share only labour as a common property to assuming that it is the 
same substance that all commodities hold in common, and then that this common substance is a 
quantum that can be measured by time, is a double jump into thin air. Rather, a more fruitful 
direction is to analyse the varied organizations of production of different kinds of labour, through 
different educational and household structures: the more important and interesting focus is the 
understanding of the processes of generating different qualities of labour in different historical 
periods and places. 
                                           
44 ‘[I]t does not in the least matter whether the labour appropriated by the capitalist is simple labour of average social 
quality, or more complex labour, labour with a higher specific gravity as it were. All labour of a higher, or more 
complicated, character than average labour is expenditure of labour-power of a more costly kind, labour-power whose 
production has cost more time and labour than unskilled or simple labour-power, and which therefore has a higher 
value. This power being of a higher value, it expresses itself in labour of a higher sort, and therefore becomes 
objectified, during an equal amount of time, in proportionately higher values.’ Capital 1, p. 304-5. 
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The ‘anomaly’ of slavery 
 
So far, we have been considering economies of wage labour, predominantly in Europe, in our 
critique of the closed commodity economy of ‘free’ labour conceptualized in Marx’s labour theory 
of value. One of the main strands of this critique has been the varied ways in which such economies 
of labour have been politically as well as economically instituted, entailing legal constraints on 
exchange, different rights to the use of labour-power in production, and different political 
constructions of the labour force through school leaving and retirement ages. There is no general 
form, in other words, no capitalism-universal logic, to the economies of wage labour. 
 
However, the assumption enshrined in Marx’s Capital is that capitalism is almost defined as being 
based on the emergence, and then universalization, of economies of ‘free’ wage labour, with the 
dissolution of forms of feudal bondage. Yet, of all the historical and geographical varieties of 
instituted economies of labour that developed with industrial capitalism – some would argue, 
indeed, as a precondition for this development – the new economies of forced labour in the 
plantation economies of Latin America, the Caribbean and North America diverged the most from 
the presumption of ‘free’ waged labour. Modern industrial-scale slavery in those regions, built on a 
slave trade of some 15 to 18 million African slaves, constituted one of the greatest historical 
movements of labour, and it was followed by an equally modernized form of indentured labour 
from India, with a further 2 to 3 million persons being transferred under various degrees of 
compulsion and bondage. 
 
Marx was well aware of the phenomenon, from 1847 when he wrote The Poverty of Philosophy 
through to Capital, the Grundrisse and Theories of Surplus Value. Moreover, though not offering a 
developed analysis, he acknowledged three key aspects of slave plantation economies: first, they 
were modern and not the archaic remnants of an earlier mode of production; second, they were 
capitalist (not solely the outcome of ‘primitive’ accumulation), even, he wrote, producing surplus 
value; and, third, they were absolutely critical to European, and especially English, manufacturing 
capital, producing cotton for the archetypical capitalist industry in the Lancashire mills. Marx was 
particularly emphatic on the modernity and originality of the North American slave economy, as 
one written, he suggested, on a tabula rasa, rather than carrying the burden of historical 
institutions.
45
 He even went so far as to say that ‘the veiled slavery of the wage-labourers in Europe 
needed the unqualified slavery of the New World as its pedestal’ (our emphasis).46 
                                           
45 America was a ‘country where bourgeois society did not develop on the foundation of the feudal system’, 
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Yet, in spite of allotting to slavery so important a role, references to it by Marx are sparse, and in 
contrast to the wealth of empirical detail deployed in setting out the labour theory of value, they are 
detached and absent from his core analysis of capitalism. Indeed, at points Marx does describe the 
plantation owners in America as capitalists; but they are also ‘anomalies within a world market 
based on free labour.’47 For Marx, as we have seen, a foundational assumption is that the capitalist 
mode of production is based on free wage labour. Slavery, although capitalist, was not free labour, 
and just did not fit the assumptions of his analysis. So, this major historical phenomenon of the 19th 
(and the 20th) century is excluded from it. 
 
Of course, there is much that Marx did not know, and could not know at that time, about the various 
economies of forced labour and their historical co-development with industrial capitalism. He relied 
heavily on secondary sources, since much discredited (for example, on J.E. Cairnes’s The Slave 
Power). It is now quite widely recognized that the plantation economies of the New World were 
critical in bringing about the ‘great divergence’48 between the then vibrant economies of the East, 
and the industrial capitalisms of Europe and North America. Apart from the availability of cheap 
and appropriate coal in England, the colonies provided key resources in sugar (calories), raw 
material for clothing, timber and other materials, thereby uniquely relieving Europe of a critical 
pressure on land. Without the vast expansion of land resources, it simply would not have been 
possible to clothe and feed a level of population, especially an increasingly urban one, in the 
emerging industrial centres. Europe, and in particular England, escaped the land constraints faced 
by other world economies of the epoch. This economic growth both drove and depended on the 
expansion of slave plantation economies. By 1860, just before the American Civil War, over 90 per 
cent of cotton for the English textile mills was produced by slaves in America. Moreover, the 
growth of world commodity markets, in which the slave trade and products of slave plantations 
were key components, was intricately woven into the development of finance capital and financial 
services industries, a leading edge of commodity market economies. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
Grundrisse, p. 884. 
46 Capital 1, p. 925. 
47 Grundrisse, p. 513. Marx can also be seen to be struggling with how to fit slavery into his conceptual framework 
when he acknowledges that American slavery belongs to a capitalist mode of production, but ‘only in a formal sense, 
since the slavery of Negroes precludes free wage-labour, which is the basis of capitalist production. But the business in 
which slaves are used is conducted by capitalists.’ Karl Marx, Theories of Surplus Value, Part II, Lawrence and Wishart, 
London 1969, pp. 302-3. 
48 K. Pomeranz, The Great Divergence. China, Europe, and the making of the modern world economy, Princeton 
University Press, Princeton 2000. 
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The growth of New World plantation economies, however, required labour on a massive scale, and 
aside from a few failed attempts to exploit the indigenous human resources, depended on migration. 
Market forces could never have induced such a shift in global population: global labour markets, 
where only economic incentives to sell labour freely as wage labour carried force, did not yet exist, 
and to this day are far from fully developed, with many barriers, legal and economic, to global 
integration. Only compulsion and force were capable of delivering the new workforces of the world. 
In the broad sweep of history of forced economies of labour, there were several different 
trajectories. For the British colonies, there was an initial phase of indentured white European 
labour, including political convicts, and land evictions, notably in Ireland during the 17th century. 
Once this source proved inadequate and diminished in scope, slavery took over until the abolition of 
the slave trade (1807) and Emancipation (1834-8). Distinctively, the Caribbean slave economies 
never developed a sustainable population of slaves, owing to high death rates, infant mortality, and 
a 4:3 male-female gender imbalance in imported slaves. In addition, as the case of Haiti 
demonstrated after the overthrow of slavery (1804), plantation economies relied on forced labour in 
production to survive. Consequently, after Emancipation, thriving sugar plantation economies such 
as Trinidad, Guyana and Mauritius depended on a new phase, quite different from the earlier ones, 
of the mass importation of indentured labour from India. This Indian indentured labour, recruited 
under varying conditions of compulsion and duress, transported in a manner and in ships very 
similar to those used for the Middle Passage, continued to produce the vital ingredients of 
developing European consumption: sugar, tea, and later rubber and rice from Burma and Malaya. 
The reliance on mass exportation of forced labour from India continued until the early 1920s. 
 
A very different economy of slave labour developed in North America. By the time of the British 
Emancipation (1834-8), America had imported only 6 per cent of the total number of slaves traded 
across the Atlantic between 1500 and 1870, compared with 38 per cent for Brazil, and 51 per cent 
for the British, French and Spanish Caribbean. But it accounted for 38 per cent of the New World 
slave population by 1825, compared with 31 per cent for Brazil, and 30 per cent for the British, 
French and Spanish Caribbean and Americas. Unlike the Caribbean, slave populations in North 
America had manifested a strong natural increase, so providing the necessary source for a constant 
and growing American-born supply of slaves. Moreover, contrary to the myths which Marx relied 
on and referred to, in general slaves were not bred for sale: internal trade in slaves formed a tiny 
fraction of overall slave labour supply, although it was critical for the colonising expansion of 
slavery in the Deep South in the early decades of the 19
th
 century. Immediately prior to the Civil 
War, the cotton plantations were growing, highly profitable, business-oriented enterprises, not 
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squeezed by the market for commodities or free wage-labour, but, to the contrary, crucially 
contributing to the growth of industry on both sides of the Atlantic. 
 
Clearly, this is not the place for a detailed analysis of the different instituted configurations of 
forced labour and their trajectories. Rather, we indicate some of the key implications for a view of 
capitalism based on a closed commodity-circuit concept of labour, such as the labour theory of 
value. These instituted economies of labour, with a particular spatial and temporal fix, exhibit a 
variety of blends of market organization, physical and military force, legal and political power, 
blends that generated profits for capitalists, including for slave-owners and slave-traders, as an 
integral part of developing and multi-faceted industrial capitalism. 
 
To begin with, in terms of production and reproduction of labour-power, the Atlantic slave trade 
combined aspects of primitive accumulation – the capture by force of people (thus turning them into 
slaves) drawn from African populations reproducing themselves outside the economies of the West. 
Indentured labour from India, often drawn from the streets of the cities or impoverished rural areas, 
were by contrast populations within the British Raj – therefore internal to, and interdependent with, 
colonial economies of the time – populations often dislocated or displaced and in a condition of 
extreme vulnerability. Both these sources of supply, however, were not self-reproducing from 
within the plantation economies, which consequently needed constant replenishment by the global 
trade in forced labour. This contrasted with American slavery, as already noted, where, by the early 
19th century, the majority of slaves were often multi-generational American in geographical origin. 
They were people born into slavery, produced internally to the plantation economies. Child-care, 
some relief from field work for pre-natal and nursing mothers, helped to sustain this source of 
slave-labour supply. Giving birth was giving birth to property, that of the slave-owners’. Not a 
second was lived by a single slave soul outside of the economy of slavery. Once capable, the child 
then formed part of the slave labour-force. In general, in both types of slave economy, self-
subsistence farming on plots of land associated with dwellings sustained the daily reproduction of 
labour, hence falling outside the commodity circuit, in the absence, of course, of wages. In 
American cotton plantations, marriage was widely supported by the grant of a dwelling and an 
associated plot of land. Thus, many aspects of the supply and reproduction of labour fall outside the 
commodity circuit, and in different ways from household or educational systems in the waged 
economies discussed above. The non-market aspects of reproduction were very much internal to the 
economic organization of the plantation. 
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Post hoc calculation of the costs of reproduction of slave labour, compared with the costs of 
achieving similar standards of reproduction of wage workers, while demonstrating the economic 
and business rationality of slave production systems, seem to miss the central point that, as with 
wage labour, the unpriced, non-costed work of reproduction within the slave economy is what 
marked the difference between economic systems. Slave-owners neither had the economic or 
statistical apparatus, nor indeed the raw information, to make such calculations, nor did they need 
them to know they were in an extremely profitable line of business. 
 
For the redistribution of labour across the world, as already remarked, force, compulsion and, for 
indentured labour, systems of recruitment and debt servitude beyond any narrow economic 
constraint or market force, were necessary in such a massive displacement. The navies of the main 
slaving states, and the force to acquire or capture colonies in the first place, were integral to the 
slave trade. Yet, it is equally true that capital markets, and financial services fuelled the trade. The 
slaving ships symbolized the combination of force and constraint and the character of the mass-
marketing of slaves as commodities for the plantation economies. Vibrant slave and indentured 
auction markets were features of colonial ports. Mortgage finance assisted planters in raising the 
purchase price for their plantation labour force. 
 
In production, first and foremost plantation economies depended on having a captive labour-force. 
In the case of slavery, captive meant for life, however long or short that might be. For indentured 
labour, a period of captive labour of generally 10 years and renewable, was combined with a 
‘contract’ for payment for a return passage or settlement in the colony with an endowment of land. 
Rarely fulfilled, such contractual obligations were the focus of constant revision and contestation. 
European forms of indentured service were radically modified in colonial legal systems, especially 
with regard to penalties and punishments, and constantly revised and regulated throughout the 100-
year duration of the institution of indentured labour – notably in the case of the British Masters and 
Servants Acts. For both slaves and indentured workers penalties for absenteeism, regimes of 
whipping and brutal force, were critical to ensuring the continuity of active labour in production.  
 
But, as has also been now well documented, plantation labour forces exhibited considerable 
hierarchical division of labour, with slaves occupying supervisory and even quasi-managerial roles, 
rewarded not by wages but by material benefits in kind and conditions of working life. Artisanal 
skills, developed on the job, or passed down through generations of slaves, contributed to the 
formation of a non-wage hierarchy of goods distribution. In American slavery, moreover, if only to 
cresi.essex.ac.uk Page 39 of 53 © 2013, University of Essex 
demonstrate just how different instituted forms of economies of labour contribute to the nascent 
political economies, slaves for short-term hire, even agencies for slave-hire, were a considerable 
and conspicuous feature of labour flexibility to meet uneven demand for slave labour in the 
plantation production cycle and production system. Slaves-for-hire advertised themselves and 
negotiated their contracts, whilst remaining slaves, bound for life to their slave-owners, and paying 
them a cut from their income. The hybridity and fluidity of slave economic institutions defies a 
narrow perspective of labour-commodity capitalism. 
 
For the use of slave and indentured labour, the dominant economic dynamic was the generation of 
profit through the production of commodities for the world market, and in particular to meet the 
demand for calories and supply the raw materials for industrial capitalism. In the labour process 
itself, therefore, once again the dominant feature is a combination of force and market productivity. 
It has been well established that sugar refineries on plantations pioneered factory industrial 
production, with considerable technological advance in steam power and industrial processing. 
Equally, the gang production systems in cotton farming, with their sophisticated internal divisions 
of labour, changing for different phases of agricultural production, ploughing, sowing, cultivating 
and harvesting, especially after the introduction of the cotton gin, have been likened to the assembly 
line production that was to typify factories many decades later. It was a division of labour that 
Adam Smith or Frederick Taylor could have approved, albeit reliant on its characteristic of being 
forced labour. No one needed to calculate the relative cost-benefits of free and forced labour for 
estimating the factor productivity of a given quantity of inputs, in order to know that slavery and 
bonded labour produced profits efficiently. One thing is for sure: the profits of slavery and 
indentured labour cannot be derived from a difference between the exchange value of labour-power 
and the values produced by labour-power in production, within a commodity market system. Profits 
for capitalists certainly; exploitation certainly; ‘surplus value’ not applicable. 
 
But were slavery and indentured labour just transitional forms, inevitably to be superseded by free 
wage labour? In one sense that is obviously the case, although, as we have argued, it applies equally 
to many forms of ‘free’ wage labour in industrial capitalisms; they too, for their part, no longer 
exist. However, it also has to be said, the disappearance of slavery and indentured labour took a 
very long time within the historical development of industrial capitalism – slavery lasting formally 
until 1865 in America; 1886 in Cuba and 1888 in Brazil; and indentured labour in plantation 
economies, British and other, until 1920. Moreover, as already emphasized, if they were transitional 
forms, they were modern ones, born and developed with and alongside industrial wage labour 
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economies, in a combined and complex economic dynamic. They were definitively not relics of 
previous modes of production. Finally, and critically, they did not just disappear because of the 
competitive economic superiority of free wage labour in a global market economy. Just as they 
were politically instituted, so politics and civil war disestablished them. Acts of Emancipation not 
market forces freed slaves in British colonies. Military defeat by the North over the slave political 
economies of the South, economically thriving and expanding in the decades immediately 
preceding the war, brought an end to that particular form of slave economy of labour. Political 
protest, both led by Ghandi in South Africa and by political movements in India, forced the British 
Government finally to terminate the systematic exportation of indentured labour from that country. 
These forms of forced labour were not economically incompatible with capitalism, but politically 
and morally incompatible with certain political institutions and developing norms. But then, as we 
have argued, free wage labour economies are also not closed market systems, nor autonomous in 
their constitution. And to this day, throughout the history of the twentieth century and in many parts 
of the world, we need no reminders of the narrowly economic compatibility of forced labour, child 
and adult, with modern capitalist productive systems. Whether in China, Indonesia, India or 
Vietnam (to point only to a few obvious cases), some of the most advanced production units of 
contemporary multi-national capitalist enterprises engage labour under conditions of forced 
constraint, debt bondage, or child servitude. There is no implacable, purely economic logic, as 
suggested by Adam Smith, that formally ‘free’ wage labour will outcompete and hence eradicate 
the many varieties and degrees of servitude. Capitalism is far from bounded by a Benthamite 
‘freedom, property, and equality’ before the law. 
 
So, although indeed transitional in a limited sense, the epoch of slavery and indentured economies 
of labour presents the most powerful empirical refutation of the narrow vision of the economy of 
capitalism enshrined in the labour theory of value. It also, as importantly, reveals an analytic failure 
to incorporate known realities into an adequate theoretical framework. To say that slavery and 
indentured labour are anomalies within capitalism is like saying that whales do not belong in the 
oceans.  
 
The neo-Polanyian turn 
 
Our critical examination of, and conceptual development from, the labour theory of value has been 
conducted using a neo-Polanyian approach of ‘instituted economic process’. In pulling this analysis 
together, we now conclude the present section by highlighting five main themes: the spatial and 
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temporal fix of economies of labour; the politically instituted aspects of economies of labour; the 
significance of knowledge and knowledge-bearers; the multi-modality of economies of labour; and 
the multi-modal generation of social inequalities. 
  
The spatial and temporal fix of economies of labour. The labour theory of value has been examined 
in terms of production, exchange, and consumption of labour – to which the spatial distribution of 
labour in economic organization, so conspicuous in the case of forced labour, also needs to be 
added.
49
 Throughout the above analysis, there has been emphasis in each of these dimensions on the 
changing and dynamic nature of economies of labour. In this approach, however, an economy of 
labour is constituted by the overall organizational configuration of these four processes in relation 
to one another, as they are instituted in time and space. So, for example, we pointed out how 
changes in the production of labour, schooling and school-leaving ages, alter the constraints to 
exchange. The development of child-care provisioning likewise both alters the process of 
reproduction of labour-power, and women’s availability on the labour market. The organization of 
the parties to the exchange can reflect changing power balances between sellers and buyers, and 
both the economic power of the buyers and the organization of the sellers of labour-power condition 
the pricing of labour. Any given configuration of production, exchange, distribution and use of 
labour thus has a temporal and spatial fix, an emergent dynamic of expansion, retraction or 
reproduction in space and time. The French salarial system of the late 20th century was an example 
referred to above, where processes of qualification of labour are tied to occupational positions and 
salarial scales that are generalized across industrial sectors, and across public and private 
employment. This in turn is linked to distinctive modes of education and training. And, to 
emphasize the point of the spatial and temporal limits of such a system, there are millions of 
workers excluded from full participation in this salarial system, youth, migrant, and marginal 
workers, aside from the gendering of this economy of labour. Segmentation of labour markets, as 
well as differences between formal and informal, legal and illegal labour markets, is also widely 
varied even across Europe. Although it is beyond the scope of the present analysis, the implication 
is clearly that there are different conditions for generating profit in the market sector that arise from 
different economies of labour, again in space and time. In short, the asymmetries of power in 
systemically generating inequalities in labour price, and hence inequalities in rights over 
commodity resources, are continuously evolving in space and time. 
 
                                           
49 The urbanization of labour, involving a massive redistribution of it, directly affects the constraint to exchange, the 
increasing and intensifying dependency on wage exchange as the only way to acquire rights over commodity 
resources; and conversely, the commodification of many of the crucial items necessary for the survival of human 
labour. 
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But the wage exchange itself – between employer and employee – cannot be seen in isolation. 
Given the central importance of the wage as a ‘fiscal handle’ for taxation (income tax, social 
insurance deductions, etc.) in all advanced capitalist economies, different taxation systems further 
condition, and often intensify, differential rights over commodity resources, the lowest wage 
earners being taxed at higher marginal rates than those that command the greatest rights over 
commodity resources through salary, property and share ownership, bonus systems, and the rest. An 
‘instituted economic process’ approach further suggests that these rights over commodity resources 
should be seen as one type of societal resource, highly significant certainly, but not the only one 
over which different social groups have differential rights. As we shall see, the analysis of divisions 
in rights over commodity resources needs to be complemented by analysis of the generation of 
divisions over public and social resources and of the intersection of the two. 
 
So, the ‘instituted economic process’ approach suggests a radically historical and spatial 
understanding of economic causality, as against a universal dynamic established once and for all at 
a point of transition from feudal to industrial capitalist modes of production. 
 
The politically instituted aspects of economies of labour. In addition to the fact that taxation and 
insurance deducted from wages has led to differential rights over commodity resources, the 
‘instituted economic process’ approach shows how legal and fiscal instruments have co-evolved 
with specifically economic organizational forms of economies of labour. These only further 
contribute to the temporal and spatial scaling of economies of labour within national and 
transnational spaces, depending on the political units involved. Whether by use of legal constraints 
or by use of fiscal incentives or penalties, political instruments are co-constitutive of the 
compulsion, or pressure, to exchange, alongside specifically economic constraints. Employment law 
can equally condition in significant respects the use of labour-power in production, the respective 
rights of employer and employee, in definitions of employment contracts, rights to industrial action, 
rules over working hours, health and safety protection, and so on. In that respect, laws of contract 
are co-constitutive of the nature of the property rights exchanged within economies of labour. In 
insisting that there are both specifically economic and specifically political dynamics constitutive of 
economies of labour, the ‘instituted economic process’ approach points to different modes of 
change being involved in the innovation of forms of economic organization, as against changing 
laws or making budgets affecting incentives and penalties. Tensions and conflicts arise as a 
consequence of the different temporalities and scales of political and economic processes, 
generating co-evolutionary change, without functionalist co-adaptation and stabilization or 
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‘equilibrium’. This co-evolutionary dynamic is hence critical to an understanding of spatial and 
temporal transformations of economies of labour. Indeed, historically what is most striking is the 
continuing and varied trajectories of co-evolution of economic and political organization of 
economies of labour: there is no steady state, no evident convergence towards a kind of uniform 
global super-capitalism. Above all, this approach facilitates the analysis of what Polanyi termed ‘the 
shifting place of economy in society’, and the dissolution of the separate, quasi-autonomous, 
spheres of polity and economy. 
 
The significance of knowledge and knowledge-bearers. From the vantage point of the present, one 
of the most fundamental transformations occurring in varied forms across developing industrial 
capitalisms has been the growth of educational systems, formal schooling, technical training, 
different levels and characteristics of teaching and learning institutions and processes, regimes of 
selection and exclusion. This is a world of difference, quite unpredictable, even unimaginable, at the 
time Marx wrote Capital. Yet, equally, from our historical vantage point, the development of 
industrial capitalism without the development of this knowledge base and the production and 
dispersion of differentiated ranges of knowledge across the working population, is also 
unimaginable. Although, retrospectively, it is possible to see that exactly the same issues about the 
production, exchange, and use of knowledge were present from the inception of the industrial 
revolution, it is perhaps only when they have achieved such a wide societal scale of significance 
that the analysis of the production, distribution, appropriation and use of knowledge in economies 
of labour becomes so evidently imperative. Adopting, from Polanyi, an anthropological method of 
inquiry towards novel forms of property rights, complex forms of appropriation both public and 
private, and processes of differentiation and distribution of different types of knowledge, an 
‘instituted economic process’ approach is able to grasp the varied and evolving patterns of the 
circulation of knowledge through knowledge-bearers in economies of knowledge. Obvious 
contrasts between guild and craft systems preceding industrial capitalism and the educational and 
knowledge production systems that developed especially from the 18th century onwards suggest, 
again, a co-evolutionary process between processes of production and reproduction of knowledge 
and developments in economic organization of industrial production. However, once more, there is 
no functionalist adaptation, and education systems are by no means confined to producing labour 
fodder. The dynamics, temporalities and scales of knowledge production and reproduction are so 
radically different from changes in industrial economic organization as to preclude any functionalist 
co-adaptation. 
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The multi-modality of economies of labour. From this analysis of the growth of knowledge and the 
generation and circulation of knowledge by knowledge-bearers, a key development is that capitalist 
economic development is multi-modal. It cannot be contained within a closed-commodity circuit 
conception of the economy. As has been highlighted by feminist economists, much work occurs 
outside the sphere of waged employment, notably in the household. Moreover, waged work is 
dependent on household, unpaid labour – although, again, one needs to emphasize that this is not a 
functionalist relationship. Beyond that household work of reproduction of labour – to which one 
must add care of the elderly, who require unwaged care for their continued well-being and 
livelihood – there is a generally hidden aspect of the unwaged work critical for any functioning 
commodity market. Consumers coordinate and integrate their purchases, not markets. And, though 
it is beyond the scope of this analysis of economies of labour, the significance of public and state 
economic activity is evident in many spheres, not least with the most symbolic commodity of 
capitalism – there would be no cars without roads, which despite many political conflicts, remain 
overwhelmingly public goods, rather than private tolled property. And there would be no life 
without water, which in many economies is a public good. As we have earlier emphasized, the neo-
Polanyian view is that forms of non-market work – of work by consumers, household labour, the 
work of students and teachers in education systems – are continuously changing and vary 
significantly both between and within countries. The approach calls for a historical and spatial 
analysis of the forms of organization of this rich variety of public state, domestic, and collective 
economic processes; and not just a labelling of them by reference to what they are not, the non-
market processes. Critical for this analysis is the dynamic interaction between multi-modal 
economic processes and their organization in complex configurations of production, consumption, 
distribution and appropriation. The example offered here of economies of labour, and the 
significance of knowledge-bearers to interdependent collective and market processes, provides one 
point of entry to such an analysis. 
 
The multi-modal generation of social inequalities and intersectionality. An enduring contribution of 
Marx’s closed-commodity circuit conception of the economy was undoubtedly to pose the question 
of why an economy systematically generated inequalities, and, indeed, growing inequalities. The 
labour theory of value was his particular, time-bound answer. Our own perspective highlights the 
major significance of inequalities of rights over commodity resources – inequalities that persist and 
often intensify when people leave employment and enter retirement. Again, different pension 
systems, public, social collective, private individual and corporate-industrial, result in very diverse 
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inequalities of rights over commodity resources.
50
 The UK is currently engaged in a general 
degradation of these rights in a race to the bottom. So, this neo-Polanyian turn in no way aims to 
downgrade the significance of the systemic generation of unequal rights over commodity resources.  
 
However, again partly because some processes were formerly less developed or visible, insufficient 
attention and analysis has been devoted to the systemic generation of inequalities over public, 
collective and social resources – and the intersection of this process with rights over commodity 
resources. Again, feminist social scientists led the way in pointing, for example, to the household as 
a site for generating gender inequalities, starting in life by the gendering of capacities and 
expectations within household social reproduction. The household remains a significant locus for 
the intergenerational reproduction of knowledge inequalities: informal and formal educative 
processes within the household underpin and reinforce inequalities established by formal, non-
household, education systems. 
 
But the significant growth in public education and the raising of school leaving ages, pioneered and 
led by the USA and Germany from the mid- to late-nineteenth centuries, have raised the 
significance of unequal rights over public resources to a new level. Of course, assumptions are deep 
that only certain proportions of the population are educable to certain levels, and that therefore there 
is a quasi-natural distribution of educational opportunities. And economies at different stages of 
development can only afford to support education of restricted sections of the population, although 
clearly one country’s inaffordability is another’s affordability, if we observe national variations. A 
societal goal of equal education, equal devotion of educational resources to all, appears to be off the 
radar, even though deep assumptions concerning the natural proportions of the educable have been 
successively overturned and radically revised during the last century and a half. Regardless of 
whether or not the aim for greater equality over these public resources – in an intergenerational 
perspective – is attainable, our focus is on the analysis of how historically and geographically these 
inequalities have been, and are being, generated. There are distinctive modes of generating 
inequalities of knowledge, changing as educational, university and research institutions develop. 
Selection systems setting quotas and proportions of successes and failures, and financial support 
and withdrawal of support for students to continue in education, are amongst the varied institutional 
instruments for generating inequalities over public resources. 
  
                                           
50 Even public- or social insurance-based pension systems endow pensioners with differential purchasing powers to buy 
commodities, so constituting a varied and historically evolving interdependence between public, social and market 
economic organization. 
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These inequalities are distinctive within nations, but they also reflect significant inequalities in the 
distribution of knowledge worldwide. They intersect and combine with global inequalities of 
commodity resources. Through the distribution of bearers endowed with knowledge capacities, and 
the huge inequalities in dedication of public resources to knowledge production and reproduction, 
distinctive additional dynamics of inequality are central to understanding international divisions of 
labour and hence global economic inequalities. 
 
We have been concerned here over inequalities in rights to educational resources in particular, 
because of their intersection with economies of labour and hence the way in which they 
demonstrate how inequalities over public and commodity resources combine and mutually amplify 
each other. A wider analysis would, of course, be needed to extend this approach to the systemic 
generation of inequalities to rights over other kinds of public resources. Water has been mentioned, 
and in many places in the world economic organization systemically generates inequalities in access 
to this most essential public good. Rights to health care and care for the old, and indeed rights to 
roads and communication infrastructures, exhibit to varying degrees modes of generating 
inequalities over public, collective and social resources. In the welfare state literature, this is 
sometimes analysed via the distinction of public versus private, where the public is seen as 
redistributive of, or mitigating, the inequalities created in the private, market-commodity circuit: a 
contest between commodification of everything and decommodification of critically important 
social goods. But that is a narrow and limited way of understanding the generation of inequality of 
rights over public resources, including within and by welfare state regimes. 
 
In conclusion, we hope to have shown in this section how a positive critique of Marx’s Capital and 
the labour theory of value – and his closed-circuit, time- and space-abstract, commodity economy – 
points the way towards a reconfiguration and revival of the materialist conception of history. 
Focusing on the inequalities systemically generated by economic organizations, and through that 
trying to gain an understanding of the potential forces and sources of change, remains central. But 
we have tried to indicate some critically important ways in which the analysis needs to be 
developed and renewed. 
 
III 
The foregoing analysis also has implications for contemporary left thinking about strategies for 
change – strategies aimed in the first instance at reducing inequality, and holding out the prospect in 
the longer term of a society thoroughly grounded in just and realistic principles of equality.  
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There is a long tradition of socialist commitment to democracy, and of activism to defend and 
extend it. From his earliest writings Marx held out the vision of a form of democracy that would 
transcend the boundaries of parliamentary politics, to run the length and breadth of the social order; 
and in his mature political writings he asserted, as a necessity for the workers’ movement along the 
way to a better society, the importance of fighting for democratic gains through trade unions, the 
ballot box, parliamentary representation and social reform. Even the Leninist tradition, with its 
instrumental attitude to what it called ‘bourgeois’ democracy, was generally opposed to the ultra-
leftism of those who adopted an abstentionist attitude to electoral politics: a workers’ movement 
unable to make serious headway through democratic elections where these were available to it was 
unlikely to find itself in a condition to win power by insurrectionist means. In the interwar period 
Leon Trotsky, for his part, waged a fierce battle against those in the Communist movement who 
dismissed the differences between parliamentary democracy and fascist dictatorship as being of no 
account. 
 
Alongside these traditions, however, there were other tropes that were to prove fateful for socialism 
in the 20th century, justifying as they did – in the name of class struggle and the harsh necessities of 
political combat – now terror, now the erosion of democratic norms and practices, now out-and-out 
dictatorship and a wanton disregard for civil liberties and the protections of human rights. There is 
no need here to rehearse all of this sorry history, but one important aspect of it was the propensity 
amongst some on the left in parliamentary-democratic countries – people living under the rule of 
law, with whatever limitations this may have involved in any given case – to make excuses for 
undemocratic actions, and even open tyranny, elsewhere. The apologetics by western communists 
and fellow-travelling socialists and liberals for Stalinism (for the purges, the show trials, the gulag) 
were only the most glaring expression of that propensity. They reflected habits of mind that have 
persisted on the left to this day, long after the effective demise of the international communist 
movement.  
 
For there are still voices in this quarter ready to identify with, or at any rate to make exculpating 
noises on behalf of, undemocratic movements and oppressive regimes. Thinking on the left about 
the relationship between anti-capitalist struggles, on the one hand, and struggles for democracy, on 
the other, sometimes displays a tendency to regard anti-capitalism as the primary commitment while 
democratic norms and procedures are treated as more open to compromise on its behalf. This 
tendency may perhaps be prompted by standard impulses of political partisanship: on account of 
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which the ‘enemy of my enemy’ becomes, if not my friend, then at least someone to be looked on 
with greater indulgence. Thus, if capitalism is the main object of antagonism, then movements and 
regimes regarded as anti-capitalist, but which are also undemocratic, may be given an easier ride 
than the elected governments of capitalist democracies. But the tendency has some independent 
theoretical underpinnings as well. It treats the capitalist economy and the political structures of 
democracy as occupying separate domains, as it were, so that efforts to shift the former in a more 
egalitarian direction or to replace it with something radically different can, depending on 
circumstances, take or leave the democratizing requirements of a truly self-active popular 
movement.  
 
Rescuing the socialist idea from the failed experiments of the twentieth century and the persisting 
tendency, in a part of the left, towards anti-democratic apologetics must continue to involve (as it 
has always involved) the insistence that central to the very conception of a transformative socialist-
egalitarian practice is that it is democratic at the root: which means in every sphere of economic and 
political organization. Democracy is not just an optional extra. The commitments to anti-capitalism 
and democracy are indissolubly linked. The force of the critique of capitalist economies and polities 
is only weakened by any relaxation of that link in projected socialist-egalitarian alternatives to 
them. Egalitarian struggles have, today, to be part of the culture of universal human rights that has 
developed since World War II and is now backed by a global civil society. In light of the previous 
history of socialism, no mature political populace will readily accept the rationalizations of an 
earlier epoch regarding the supposed need to curtail democratic rights and liberties because of ‘the 
struggle’ or of the necessities of economic development. 
 
But beyond these general points, we would argue, in addition, that there are considerations specific 
to the ‘instituted economic process’ approach that strengthen the case for not driving a wedge 
between economy and polity.  
 
First, there is no pure or universal model of the capitalist economy or of the relationship at its heart, 
that between capital and labour. The economy not being a closed system, it and the capital-labour 
relation are always and everywhere partly formed by political processes and legal norms; they are 
not simply a product of economic power. As we have attempted to show in the previous section, 
such legal, political and other social structures are co-constitutive of the pressure on the possessors 
of labour-power to exchange it. All the more reason to see the project of improving and extending 
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the democracy of the polity and that of establishing just principles of economic equality as 
intimately related. 
 
It is, after all, an old socialist theme that the democracy of the state is bound to be flawed, at best, 
where it coexists with economic relations in which wealth is distributed as unequally as it is in 
every capitalist country (with whatever variations). In these circumstances political power and 
influence, too, are bound to be unequal. But the causal relationship runs in the opposite direction as 
well. A state, a party or a movement from which political democracy is absent, or in which it is 
severely restricted, is not well fitted to achieving egalitarian objectives. The historical evidence is 
overwhelming that power which is not responsible and accountable to those over whom it is 
wielded will tend towards decisions unduly favourable to the interests of those who exercise it and 
the social groups – classes, strata or whatever – to which they are most closely linked. Democracy 
with exceptions, curtailments and apologetic excuses will not only be uncongenial to any politically 
experienced electorate today, casting doubt upon the sincerity of the egalitarian ideals professed by 
those seeking power in pursuit of change, it is also inadequate to the tasks of a transformative 
egalitarian movement. Political democracy and social and economic equality are profoundly 
interdependent, and the want of either must distort and weaken the other. 
 
Second, it is no longer feasible to think of socialist-egalitarian progress as turning upon a single axis 
of change, in which capitalist exploitation in the classic Marxian meaning is abolished. It is no 
longer feasible because the model of relative economic advantage and disadvantage on which that 
conception relied was itself too simple, as we have shown. There is not a unique and universal 
differentiation according to which one class simply owns productive material assets while another 
class simply does not. Though this is indeed still a relevant and crucial dimension of economic 
differentiation and one yielding great relative benefits to those on the better off – that is, the 
possessing – side of it, real capitalist societies are also characterized by a multiplicity of other 
differentials of comparative advantage, not all of them reducible to that which divides the owners of 
material means of production from the non-owners. There are gendered inequalities, differences in 
access to educational opportunity, differences in access to available work, or to well-paid work, and 
to space and housing and health and insurance, and to a clean environment and to water, and more. 
Combating exploitation cannot, consequently, be thought of as simply undoing the appropriation by 
one class of the surplus produced by another. A more comprehensive conception of what a just 
egalitarian distribution of advantages and disadvantages would look like is required.  
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Nor can this issue of the multiple sources of comparative advantage be finessed by referring it to the 
Marxian distinction between productive and unproductive labour – so that the essential division is 
said to be between capitalist exploiters and those engaged in productive labour for profit, while 
other categories of ‘unproductive’ worker supposedly share in the surplus appropriated by the 
capitalist class, share in it in exchange for servicing the consumer wants of that class. The very 
distinction between productive and unproductive labour is predicated on the theory of value – value 
as labour-determined – that we have shown to be conceptually incoherent. This distinction cannot 
survive the theory’s demise, and neither can any secondary theoretical argument which depends on 
it. 
 
Furthermore, there are grounds for thinking that the Marxian focus on the (class) distinction 
between those monopolizing the means of production and those without access to any such material 
means played its part in what went wrong with the would-be anti-capitalist revolutions of the 20th 
century. There was an assumption that collectivization of the means of production and state 
planning would, in and of themselves, halt the genesis of fresh inequalities at their source, so to 
speak. Abstracting from other possible sources of inequality, however, disguised from supporters of 
those failed socialist experiments the danger of new inequalities posed by state ownership of 
property itself.  
 
The multiplicity of dimensions of comparative advantage is a conclusion with far-reaching 
theoretical consequences. It means, at bottom, that the conception of a route to socialism based on 
the abolition of class exploitation must give way to – or evolve into – one of a route based on a 
more comprehensive theory of just egalitarian distribution. The latter denouement is an ironic one. 
It is ironic when one bears in mind the dismissive attitude of so many within the Marxist tradition to 
normative liberal theory. But, in any case, realities of political economy – always the primary 
domain of Marxist research and argument – themselves dictate that outcome, since they are the site 
of many inequalities, multiple sources of differential advantage, dividing not only owners from non-
owners, but also high-earning scientific personnel and earners in other relatively privileged 
categories from cheap labour; male from female workers; those with and those without higher 
education; people with ample pensions and people without; some with access to free or easily 
affordable medical care and others without; and so on. A society free of exploitation in the classic 
Marxian meaning would not, in and of itself, be a justly egalitarian one unless it were based on 
more generally just principles of distribution. 
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On the left today we are therefore confronted with a task of analysis and advocacy in support of the 
case that just distributive principles are egalitarian ones, and of explaining further what specific 
concept of equality is to be supported. For it is a well-known feature of the general notion of 
equality that it needs to be further specified before one can know what it entails. A plea for equality 
always invites the question equality of what? In face of the plurality of existing differences of 
comparative advantage and disadvantage, should the left be arguing for equality of resources, or 
equality of well-being, or equality of opportunity, or Rawlsian inequalities justified only when they 
benefit the least well-off, or something else again? We shall not undertake the necessary task of 
analysis and advocacy here, but only insist on its being necessary, and the more so in the light of an 
‘instituted economic process’ approach, highlighting as this does the many dimensions of privilege 
and lack that exist across contemporary capitalist economies.  
 
We will add, merely by way of indication, that exact equality of resources cannot be the aim where 
differences of need are taken into account, and equality of well-being is also problematic as an 
objective if the free choices of individuals are to be respected, since free choices inevitably generate 
unequal results – owing to differences in luck and to good and bad judgement – and it is debatable 
whether, or how far, such different outcomes ought to be ‘levelled’ by interventionist public policy. 
Equality of opportunity is also not unproblematic. What is often called ‘equality of opportunity’, as 
things are, is plainly not at all that, given how inequalities in one generation get passed on to the 
next. The advantages which richer parents can buy for their children, in terms of better physical 
surroundings, better health care, better education, better everything, are bound to mean that their 
children have greater opportunities than poorer children. Genuine equality of opportunity – or 
something approximating it, for perfection in this domain, as in most, is likely to be unattainable – 
could only be based on a greater equality of condition in the parental generation, so to put it, and on 
serious efforts to counteract the disadvantages among its offspring that are passed on willy-nilly.  
 
Thinking through these problems and proposing solutions to them is an indispensable theoretical 
undertaking, and its necessity and difficulties throw a cruel light back on the self-satisfied stance of 
those Marxists who still profess to believe that Marx, though he supplied so little in this domain, 
was pretty much just ‘right’ about the things that matter most.  
 
Because an egalitarian, non-exploitative society would aim to provide a decent life for all its 
members according to just criteria of need, effort, desert and so on, the democratic political 
institutions of such a society cannot be persuasively theorized purely by reference to abolishing 
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divisions of class. Everyone is to be included in rights of citizenship and covered by the basic 
protections afforded by human rights. A reconstructed materialist politics must be as insistent on 
democratic rights and liberties as it is on the necessary transformation of global capitalism; as 
committed to the democratic traditions that have evolved within bourgeois societies as to the task of 
creating more egalitarian economic forms. 
 
It is a striking feature of recent times and of the economic and financial crises with which the 
institutions of national, regional and international governance are still struggling that the left has 
mostly not been the clear beneficiary, in gaining fresh and vigorous mass support. Here and there 
Marx’s name is invoked and his theories are commended as having a new – or revived – relevance. 
But such talk is principally at a superficial level; it is not translated into serious programmatic 
argument or policy recommendation, a state of affairs suggesting that the old Marxian ‘unity’ of 
theory and practice remains sundered. In the light of what has been argued by us here, this should 
not surprise anyone. Former models of socialist strategy or egalitarian politics, based as they 
centrally were on the closed-system conception of labour, exploitation and the capitalist economy 
more generally,  need to be rethought from the bottom up. 
 
They need also to be integrated – as they never properly were in the traditional Marxist political 
vision – in a fully elaborated ethical critique and alternative. One of the signal strengths of the 
original conception of a transformative socialist politics founded in historical materialist analysis 
was to insist that its critique of capitalism must be more than merely abstract criticism. It was to be 
grounded in (a) an understanding of real socio-economic tendencies, and (b) a real social movement 
capable of effecting change. At the same time Marx bequeathed to the tradition he founded a one-
sided rejection of moral advocacy (sometimes formulated in overtly relativizing terms) that was out 
of harmony with the commitment to certain universal values implicit in his critique of exploitation. 
A reconfiguration of materialist thinking towards progressive change needs not only to improve on 
the economic analysis founded by Marx, but in so far as such improvements are called for, as we 
have argued above that they are, it must also be able to engage with normative arguments in the 
area of human rights and different conceptions of equality and justice. No more than in Marx’s day 
will a moral critique of capitalism suffice; but unless there is a moral case for socialism there is no 
case for it, and it needs to be properly articulated. 
 
